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Abstract
Transshipment is the practice of sharing common resources among supply chain mem-
bel's in order to mitigate the risks of uncertain demands. The main theme of this th sis
is the transshipment problem in decentralized supply chains. The members of decen-
tralized supply chains are elf-interested agents who do not necessarily consider the
efficiency of the whole chain, and need contracts that specify thedetails of their coop-
eralion. We provide asystematic overview of coordinating contracts in supplycbains
before focusing on three specific questions concerning the decentralizee!tran hipment
problem.
The first problem ade!rpssee! by this thesis i to fine! coordinatingtmnsshipmenteon-
tmet for upply chains with two agents. Weproposeatransshipm ntcontractthat
always coordinates the general two-agent supply chains. This mechanism relies on
an implicit pricing mechanism, i.e. agents initially agree on a formula for setting the
transshipment prices, and once quantity decisions have been made and prior to the
realization of demands, they fix thetrausshipment prices.
The second problem is to find coordinating contracts with a pricing mechanism in
supply chains with more than two agents. We propose a mechanism for deriving the
transshipment prices baseci on the coordinating allocation rule intI'oducedby Anupindi
etal. (2001). With the transshipment prices being set, the agents are free to rnatch
their residuals based on theirindividl.lalpreferences. It has been shown that with the
transshipment prices derived from the proposed mechanism, the optimum transship-
mentpatternsarealwayspair-wisestable, i.e. there are no pairs of agents that can be
jointlybetteroffbyl.lnilaterallydeviatingfromtheoptiml.lmtransshipmentpatterns.
The third problem pertains to the effects of eoopemtion costs on transshipment games.
Despite its practical relevance, the issue of cooperation cost has not beenaddresseci
in the upplychain contracting literature thus far. We study the cooperative trans-
hipment game with symmetric newsvendors having normally distributed independ nt
demands. We provide characterization of optimal individual quantities, the maximum
exp cted profits, and individual allocation for these games. Th eresults, though
interesting by themselves, are only a point of departure forstudying the games with
cooperation costs. We provide conditions for stability (non-emptiness of the core) of
these games under two governance network structures. i.e. clique and hub.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A supply chain is the set of entities involved in the design of new products and services,
procuring raw materials, transforming them into semi-finished andfinishedproduct,
and delivering them to the end customer (Swaminathan and Tayur, 2003). In abroad
sense a supply chain consists of two or more legally separated organizations, being
linked by material, information and financial flows. These organizations may be firms
producing parts, components and end products, logistic service providers and even
the ultimate customer, and in a narrow sense the term supply chain is also applied
to a large company with several sites often located in different countries (Stadtler
and Kilger, 2008). The main underlying tenet of Supply Chain Management (SCNI)
is that organizations can improve their performance in terms of higher profit levels
andcustomersatisfaction,andlowerlead-timesanduncertaintiesthroughintcgration
and collaboration with other organizations who are partsofthesamesupplysystem.
Therefore, as discussed by Lee (2004), top-performing supply chains po
qualities: (1) great supply chains are agile and they react speedily tosuddenchanges
in demand or supply, (2) they adapt over time as market structurcs and strategies
evolve, and (3) they align the interests of all the firms in the supply chain so that
companies optimize the chain's performance when they maximize their interest.
The ultimate goal in managing supply chains is to better serve themarket. Jnarecent
study, Fawcett et al. (2008) found that the top four perceived benefit of SCM are
improvements in responding to customer requests, on-time delivery, customersatis-
faction,andorderfulfillmentlead-time. The same study also highlights that after the
inadequacy of required information systems, the most important barriertoachieving
the SCM benefits is the lack of clear supply chain guidelines. Therefore, the chal-
lengeinmanagingsupplychainsisnotjuttheaspirationtoimprovetheefficiencyof
thewholesupplychain,butthemechanismstoactuallycoordinatethemanycomplex
processes spanning across it. Without appropriate mechanisms, uncoordinated supply
chains may suffer drastic inefficiencies. Narayanan and Raman (2004) elaborate the
example of Cisco Systems, Inc. and show how the lack of coordination mechanisms
resulted in 2.5 billion dollars of inventory write-offs.
Transshipment is thepracticeofsharingmll1l1lonresourcesamongdiffercllt agents
in supply chains in order to mitigate the risks associated with uncertain demands.
In manufacturing, transshipment is typical in industries wherein the volatile market
demandsshouJd be met by utilizing pre-specified production capacities/quantities. In
retailing, transshipment of inventories can also boost the service level while reducing
inventory costs. The time lag between decisions on production/order quantities and
the realization of random demands-which could be due to long procurement lead-
times or technological constraints-makes the initial decisions an inflexible parameter
at the time of demand realization. The option to transship provides the agents with
the opportunity to improve efficiency both at the individual and networklevels.
Transshipment can be implemented in a variety of circumstances when uncertainties
aboute.."ternalfactorscannotbeadequatelyhandledinadvance.For many production
supply chains, procurement of raw materials and parts with long lead-times in antic-
ipationofralldommarketdemand isa major concern, both for supply chain agents
and ultimate customers in some cases such as HINI vaccines (Hirs hler and Kelland,
2009). As tbe volatility of market demand increases, the risk of mismatch between
the stacked resources and actual demand escalates. An exampleoftran hipment
practice is discernible in the oil industry where volatility of demand and limitation
of regional refinery capacities make tran hipmenta reasonable practice (Dempster
et aI., 2000). Other examples of trans hipment in the retailing industry come from
automobile dealer networks (Zhao et aI., 2005), computer retailing (Shaoetal.,200),
construction machinery (Rao et aI., 2000), and apparel (Mogre et a!., 2009). Although
in most cases transshipment is done by physically moving products and inventories
from one agent to another, this feature is not necessary. In virtual transshipment,
the customers of one agent may be served directly from another agent. This type of
transshipment is common in the electricity markets (Yang and Qin, 2007).
n'aditionally, operations management deals with centralized systems where it is as-
sumedthatasingleagentchoosesallthenecessaryactionsandmakesalltherelevant
decisions for the whole system. Therefore, optimization is the primary concern for de-
cisionmakers. However, decisions in real supply chains are usually dccentralized. Thi
iseitber because the supply chain is comprised of agents with different preferences
(e.g. rlifferentownerships),ora large number of decisions adcl to system complexity to
thepointthatcentralizeddeci ion making and control are infeasible---t;o the decisions
must be distributed among autonomous agents. The issue here is that, when agents
indiviclually optimize their c1ecisions, supply hain efficiency is not necessarily maxi-
mized. Hence, coordination becomes a major problem. In decentralized system, the
major goal is to design appropriate coordinating mechanisms so thatindividualdeci-
sions are coordinated. These mechanisms are either contractual mechanisms (among
separately-owned interacting agents) or performanceevaluationmeasures(amongin-
teractingagents with the same ownership structure). In both cases, acoordinaling
mechanism transforms the agents' objective 0 that they would be aligned with the
integrated supply chain objectives. The fundamental working hypothesis is that each
agent, being rational, maximizes its individual objective. Therefore, a coordinating
mechanism needs to ensure that individual decisions result in supply chain's maximum
efficiency. The main tool for studying the decision makingprocesscsofrationaI agents
is game theory. TheanalyisoftbetransshiplOentprobIemissignificaullycomplicated
in decentralized supply chains where transshipments are done among self-interested
rationaJagents. Thepurposeofthistbesisistostudythecontractualmecbanismsfor
coordinating the transshipments in decentralized supply chains.
When supply chain agents intend to cooperate with each other, they need contracts
thatspeciry the details or their cooperation. Although contracts have been studied in
law, economics, and marketing disciplines, th irstudy in operations management and
SCM takes a rather different approach: "What clistinguishes SCM contract analy is
may be its focus on operational details, requiring more explicit mod ling of materials
Aowsand complicating factors such as uncertainty in the supply or demand of prod-
ucts, forecasting and the possibility of revising those forecasts, constrained production
capacity, and penalties for overtime and expediting" (Tsay et aI., 1999, p. 302). In
SC~J, the issue of contracts and their effects on agents' decisions becomes central
once one approaches a supply chain as the nexus-oj-contmcts (Whang, 1995). This
emphasizes that a supply chain is a collection of self-interested agents bound together
through a set of contracts. This thesis mainly investigates transshipment contracts
and their effects on tbe supply chain efficiency.
When optimization of the system's total efficiency is (at least partially)in conAict
with agents· incentives, reconciliation of these conAicts is the goal of coordinating
contmcts. A coordinating contract has three characteristics:
(a) Lhe seL of supply chain opLimum decisions should be a pure Nash equilibrium;
(b) it should divide the supply chain profits arbitrarily among theagents;and
(c) iLshould be worth adopLing (Cachon, 2003).
Supply chain coordination through conLracts has been a burgeoning area of research in
recenLyears. InspiteofrapiddevelopmenLofresearch,tbereareonlyafewsLrucLured
analysesofassnmptions, method ,and real-life-applicability of result inthi field. In
ChapLer2, asystematic [ramework of contracting in supply cbain contexLispresented.
The aim oftbat cbapter is to provide asysLematic overview of coordinaLingconLracLs
in supply chains through highlighLing the main concepts, assumptions,meLhods,and
presenting the state-of-the-art research in this field
Tlw first 'luestion addressed by this thesis is to filld roordillatillg trallsshiplllcllt COII-
LracLs for a supply chain wiLh only two agents. InChapter3,westudyasupplychain
wiLh Lwo independent agents producing a similar product and cooperaLing Lhrough
transshipment. Previous research shows Lhat only under a certain range of problem
parameters, a set of linear tmnsshipmentprices (i.e. transshipment prices Lhatare
fixed before the decisions on prodution/orderquantities have been made) could be
found which induce the agents to decide Lheir production quantities so Lhal Lhe Lotal
expected profit of the two agents equals the maximum expected profit of thecelltral-
ized supply chain. However, even Lhough such transshipment prices do exist, Lhey
result in exc!usive divisions of total expected profits and thus theycannotaccomma-
dale Lhe arbitrary division oftolal expected profiLs due todifferenLbargaining powers
of the agents (the second coordination requirement in Cachon'sdefinition (Cachon,
2003)). Using the Generalized ash Bargaining Solution, we model Lhe negoLiaLion
between the agents over the division of total expected profit resulting from theirca-
operation, and derive a coordinating contract for this setting. ThisconLract has an
implicit pricing mechanism and houJd be carried out in two rounds. In the first
round, the agent set the tran hipmentpricesasan implicit function of their pro-
duction quantities, and in the second round,after the agents individuallydccidetheir
quantities,theyfixthenegotiatedtran hipment prices by selecting them among all
the possible transshipment prices.
Thesccondquestionistoinvesligatethecoordinatingcontractswithpricingmecha-
nisms in upply chains with more than two agents. This question is studied in Chapter
4. The contracts wbich are based on allocation ruJesrequireagentstobeabIe to take
advantage of side payments (which may be infeasible in some situation ). From the
implementation point of view, these contracts also need a governing agent to collect
and redistribute the realiz d profits among the members of the coalition. In order
to avoid these diflicultie-, the agents can turn to the contracts with pricing mecha-
nisms. Then, whenever a transshipment between an agent with surplus and another
on withoutstandingd mandhappens,thelatlerpaystheformerasumproportional
to the amount transshipped. Theadvantageisthattheadditionalinstitulionrequired
for redistribution of extra profits becomes unnecessary-agents who areinvolvedina
transshipment transaction can handle the redistributions without incentive-aligning
side payments. As this thesis' main contribution to this question, we show that trans-
hipment among several agents resemble a matching game in a two- ided market
where the supply and demand values are real numbers. We have derived a pricing
mechanism with which optimal transshipment patterns are always pail'-wisestableso-
lutions to the corresponding matching process, i.e. given thetransshipmentprices,no
pairs of agents can simultaneously improve their profits by mutuaIly deviating from
the optimal transshipment patterns.
The third question pertains to the effects of cooperation costs 0 ntransshipmentgames
Chapter 5 addresses the cooperative transshipment game with symmetricnewsvendors
having independent and normally distributed demands. The cooperative transship-
ment game without cooperation costs has been well studied in the literature,however,
general analytical results for it seem out of reach at themomenl. We provide char-
acterizations of optimal indi\·idual quantities, the maximum expected profits, and
individual allocations for these games. In particular. we prO\'e that though individual
allocations grow with the coalition size they diminish at the same time according to
two laws of diminishing individual allocations. These result though interesting by
themselves are only a point of departure for studying the games with cooperation
costs. In reality, when agents seek to cooperate with each other, they have to in ur
negotiation and governance costs, e.g. monitoring and infrastructure. Thecoopera-
tion costs depend on the cooperation network structure. We consider two: (I) Clique
network structure, where all the ag nts in the coalition are directly linked to each
other; and (2) Hub network structur, where the agents are linked LO a d signated
roorrlillatoragellt.WeprovirletllPnrressaryandsufficielltconriitiOIl fOI'II1l'cotpel'
link necessary torendel' the core of the game non-empty fOl'both network structures
These maximum admissible costs are always decreasing for cliques, how v r, increas-
ingor exhibiting a unimodal pattern for hub. To the best of our knowledge, these
results are the first to incorporate cooperation costs in the analysis 0 ftran hipment
games in the operational research and operations management literature.
1.1 Thansshipment Games
At this point, it is worthwhile to distinguish among the variation of transshipm nt
games which are analyzed in different sections of the thesis. The noration used in this
thesis is listed on pages xi and xii.
1.1.1 Non-cooperative Transshipment Game
A non-cooperative transshipment game is a stochastic game. In a two-agent non-
cooperative transshiprnent game, it will be shown that agent i's expectedprofitequals
J,oc(s,X) = E[r,min{Xi,D;} +v,l1, -",Xi + (';j -tij -v;)min[(Dj-Xjr,(X, - Dir]
(Ll)
Chapter 3 analyzes this game for a supply chain with two agents.'
1.1.2 Non-cooperative/cooperative Transshipment Game
A non-cooperative/cooperative transshipment game is a two-stage game. The first
stage game is a stochastic non-cooperative game, and the second stage game, which
is played after the realization of demands, is a deterministic cooperative game. This
game was first formulated by Anupindi et a!. (2001) The profit function for each
individual agent is
J,DC(X) = E [1'; min{X" D,} + v,Hi - C;X, + Q',(X, D)] (1.2)
where Q'i(X, D) represents agent i's allocation of the second stagedeterministiccoop-
erative game, i.e., ex post cooperative transshipment game. For given X and D, the
expostcooperativetransshipmentgameassignstoanysub-coalitionQC;Nth value
f/ql'qUIl.!stO
,~I\'"~JI,, tQ
1W... ~EJ' jtQ
1I'.,2;O.....<.}tQ (13)
Tht a ,oM. coopl'I'Su,,,, lcanllSbJpmeat pone I:!I also mo.m .. ~ht 0 .....11 Game
(Owea.. I91'S), CMpw' 4 ~,~ Iht nOIt·roopenl.ll''''/rooperall,'e mualupttK'l11
1.1.3 CooI>crative 'I't-ansshil>!llCut Gamc
A coopen.t"" I...-b.!pmnll pme (01 lhe a GnU: coopl'I'Su,,,, l...-hipment~
...ben tht refem10e ~ not immedialel)'cleaf from lheCOOlext) ilia ~lL\'esame
... th aMod>aaiticcll&racteriillCfunctiQm{Slikkro"<'\a1.. :?005). n.e aankcoopl'l'SU'"
Ira..lIlllpmellt p'ne~ to 1ltI)' coalltioll QlO .\' lhe , .....ue Jq .'hioch ill &lven by
jq.t~JQ(X).II':"EI~(~.n,.,{x•. D')'V,If.-c,X,).f/q(X.D)] (II)
kllVSIf"V'.Q
,fuH"JSEJ,VJ'Q
Il"J ~O,V'.)'Q
(I.S)
independelltand normall)'distnooteddculllllds.
1.2 Centralized Transshipment Problem
In Cbapten 3. 01. Bod S. all traRllihlpme"t ..mea are oom~ ..,tb ll~ ClelIUal·
izII'dtl1UlSlllul'''_probIem, ~l"ffiIraliZlt'dt.......ru.~~.t""roIloo<inc
stochao;ticopt,mlalion problem:
ll~lUJ(X). "'t"E[l;.(r,mlll(x"v,).v,lf, c,x,).l/,~(X,D}] (1.6)
R...(X, D)
];..1l;,SIf"V.iS
J;,i1" S EJ.VJ i.'
II, ~O.V,.jiX
"
(1.7)
ThejolLowing chapter is an edited version 0[-
B. Ilezarkhani and W. Kubiak. Coordinating contracts in SCt-I: A review of methods
and literature. Decision Making in ManujactlLf'ing and Services, 4(1-2):5--2 ,2010
Chapter 2
Coordinating Contracts in Supply
Chain Management: A Review of
Methods and Literature
Summary: Supply chain coordination through contmcts has been a
burgeoning m'Cll oj research in recent years. lnspiteojmpiddevelopment
oj research, thereareonlyajewst1"1J.cturedanalysesojassumptions,meth-
ods,andapplicabilityojinsightsinthisjield. The aim oj this chapter is to
provide asystematic overviewojcoordinaling contmctsinsupply chains
through highlighting the main concepts, assumplions, methods,andpresent
theslale-oj-the-m·t,y;sea,·chinlhisjield.
2.1 Introduction
The Supply Chain ManagemenL (SCM) paradigm asserts Lbat when making dec ntral-
ized decisions, the efficiencyofLhe whole sysLem should betaken inLoconsideraLion
When decision makingi decenLralized,i.e.decisionsaremadebyindependenLagents
cOll1prisingthechain,optirnizingthesystell1'stotalefficiencymightbein conAict with
Lheagents' incentives. Therefore,coordinatingtheagents'deci ion b comes a major
issue. By viewing a supply chain asanexu-of-contracts (Wang and Parlar, 1994),
i.e. a group of rational agenLs interacting WiLh each other according to pre-specifi d
rules, more efficient SCM isachieveclbydesigningappropriatecontracts coordinating
the agenLs' decisions. This is Lbe main objective of research on coordinating con-
Lract in supply chains. Althougb contracts have been studied in law, cconomics, and
marketing disciplines, their study in SCM takes a rather different approach
WhaLdistinguishe SCM contract analysis may beiLs focusonoper-
ational details, requiring more explicit modeling of material Aows and
complicating facLorssuch as uncertainty in Lhesupply or demand 0 fprod-
uCLs,forecastingandLhepossibilityofreviingthoseforecasts,consLrained
production capacity, and penalties for overLime and expediting (TsayeL al.,
1999).
A contract specifies the mechanism for governing the interaction contingencies among
agents. It manifests Lhe exchange of promises regarding the actions which areto be
done in Lime. Necessarily, contracts must be enforceable, i.e. theagcnts'refrainmenL
from fulfilling their promises should be ruled out (or made highly improbable). For a
contracLLobeenforceable,itsLerms(themutualpromises),sbouldbellcrifiablebyan
enforcing body. However, the verifiabilityofa contract's term is dependent on the
enforcing body. Ifacontract·s terms are verifiable bya court of law, LhaLconLracL
"'Ouldl:>ealefjQlconlrllct
SupplychaincolltractsllT<!lIotal"1lY"rcqlli,,-odtol:>elcgaJ Se,."ralpapersillthe
lilerature consider colltracts allloug illdepeudent agents that are division'l of the same
OOmp<lllylludahigherle,."lmnrmgcrrll1'."rif},thercllditionofllltcTIlI promise8 (e.g
Chen (19'J9j,Lecaud Whallg(1999},lUldZhllng{2OOG)). Ne,."rthck"",theprOCCSlof
colllractd<)!lignshollld""plidllypointOlltlhe,."rifyingabililyoftheenfo"";ngllgellt
'J\""Oapl,r"""hesto,",,,;fi,,,,liollare<lelt'ClableiulheliterMmc: ,hrl'(;t, ,,,,,1 iudirt'Cl
In diroct ""rificatioll,lhccondiliolls regarding lhc fulfillmcntofconlrllCt ler",smust
l:>eolMen.'6d. How..,...r,in indiT<"C1 ,..".ifi<'at;ou,th.. aforcrnenlionnlron<lilionsmaybP
in/erred. In realily, lht, "er;ficaliolll>r\lCelll!l iSllllli"lu,eoflheIWOllpprOllCh"". An
exampleofdin'Ct "erifical;ou isthed~i""r)"oflheprodurlsorderedfrornasupplier
bya retailer. The relililer Can ohierye, Le.com't, the ullll,lJerofprodncts ,,-'<:Ch'ed
l",.lirecl ""rificalions are8chienod "'hcli accrlaiu ""lion isoomidernl Iol:>ellecesshry
(orsclf-cllforring) fora rational agent, F'orc-xllmplc, II mnnu[n.cturerean ,."rifylhllt
iflhemarketsellmgpriceisgres.lert...."lhet<ltalproduclionroat8ndSlllvage,'lIlue.
lhe retailer "'Ould salisfy market. demanrl lIS lIlllch IIlI il can
The study of supply chain contracts il. an interdisciplinary t"CIIetlrd' Mes. For Lhe
1llOtit l>arl, il is a symhcs;s of i"'''''nl'''1' throry (e,g. Zipkin (2000)), gam~ lhrory (e.g
O"."n (1995)), and ""..trocl ~c",wmics throT'1/ (e,g. Brousseau aud Clamant (2002))
In spite of rapid dcwlopmClll of rcsemch Oil slIpplychain oonlracting lind coordi"a.
lioll, ll,cre arc only a few slrurl\lrc~l Nlaly8C8 of the assmnptiollll, lllClhotl>l, "ud the
implicaliou.ofinsighlsillthisficld.lt.leV!llltcxaml'lt".jllcludeLiand\\'..ng(ZOO7),
ChallclW. {2l'Xl4l. LiaJld \\'ang (zoor:. 8Jld COlllcz-PadillaetRI. (2005). n,ca;lllof
thischaplcriJIto I'rovideagcueraJo"er.,iewofcoordinMingCOlllraclJlin sllpplyd,Rins
throllgh highlighting th<lmRillCOllCl!P!g,assumptiolls, nlelhotls,audpreselltlllglhc
framework encompassing the most important components of these theories
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. InSection2.2,theconceptofcoordi-
nation in SCM contracting is elaborated. Section 2.3 provides a classification scheme
for coordinating contract in supply chains. Some of the well-known contractual mech-
literature based on theproposecl classification cheme. Section2.6discussessev ral
issucswith regarcl to coordinating contracts in SCIVI and finally, Section2.7introdu es
2.2 Coordination and Supply Chain Contracts
As a rule of thumb, the efficiency of a centralized decision making system issupe-
rior to that of a decentralized system, all other things being equal. A well-known
justification of the latter is the double marginalization conundrum (Spengler, 1950).
The incompatible incentives of agents in a decentralized system make the decisions
that are optimal for the agents sub-optimal for the whole chain. Intbedecentralized
supply chain literature, coordination refers to theequivalenceofagents'individuaIly-
optimaldecisions2 withtbeoptimaldeci ion of the (centralized) supplychain3 . The
incompatibility of incentives in decentralized supply chains stems from the funda-
mentalcharacteristicofagent,i.e.,mtionality. The rationality ofindivicluals implies
that each agent seeks to maximize its own utitity, and moreover, each agent is able to
calculate its optimal decisions, which lead to the maximization 0 fits utility, given the
information ithas4 . As the result, the agents do not undertake the supply chain op-
timaldeci ions unless they know that those decisions are also optimal for themselves.
In order to coordinate a supply chain, a contract rnust tran form theagents'utility
functions in a way that the supply chain optimal decisions would also be optimal
for the agents. However. thi is only one necessary condition for a contract to be
coordinating. Another necessary condition is that a contract must not be forced
upon agents: they must willfully accept the contract. The literature contains at lcast
two approaches to fOfl1ll1lating the acceptability condition ofacontract. The firt
approach implies that a contract is acceptable ifit leads to the utili tyofeachagent
being above a certain acceptablelevcl for that agent. These levels can be interpreted
differently, e.g. reservation profits, opportunityeosts, outside options, or status quo
utilities. The second approach demands that not only should an acceptablecontract
guarantee minimum amounts of utilities to the agents, but it also must divide th
extrautiiities in a fair manneramongthem5 , Cachon (2003) states three conditions
that a coordinating contract should meet:
(I) with a coordinating contract, the set of supply chain optimum decisions should
be a pure Nash equilibrium;
(2) it houlddividethe upplychainprofits (utilities in general) arbitrarily am ng
the agents; and
(3) it should be worth adopting.
The first condition is concerned with the transformation ofagellts' utility functions.
Although this definition does not directly specify tbe acceptability condition, the
second condition implies that if a contract can divide the supply chainprofitsamong
agents in any manner, at least one of those division schemes should be acceptable
toallagents6 . Unfortunately, the criteria for assessing the third condition are rather
vague, but it could be taken as the combination of other qualitative acceptability
conditions yet to be formalized.
Alternatively, Ganeta!. (2004) define coordinating contract as
a contract which the agent of a upply chain agree upon and the
optimizing decisions of the agents under the contract satisfy each agent'
reservation payoff fminimum acceptable utilitiesfcon traint and lead to
Pareto-optimal decisions and Pareto-optimal sharing rule.
Thisdcfinition formulates the acceptability condition according to thc first approach
stated earlier (satisfaction of minimum acceptable utilities). Onc drawback of this
approach is that it does not indicate how one contract should be agree I by the agents
in cases where there exists multiple contracts with Pareto-optimal sharing rules which
sati fy the agent's minimum acceptable utilities. Gan et a!. (2004) also define fie.rible
coordinating contract as a coordinating contract uch that by adjustment of some
parameters, it could lead to any Pareto-optimal sharing rule.
Despite the different interpretation" ofacceptabilitycondilion ofacoordinalingcon-
tract in Cachon (2003) and Ganetal. (2004), the fundamental notion in bothdefi-
nilions are similar. That is, with a coordinating contract. agents' optimum decisions
must be the same as the upply chain's optimum decisions, and the contract should
divide the resultant payoffs among them SO that all agentsarf'sati fiedand asthf'
result they would accept thecontracl. We provide two variation of the conc ptof
• WeakCoordinalion: Ifa contract could achieve the equivalence of agent 'opli-
mal decisions (pure Nash equilibrium) and the supply chain's oplimal decisions,
and at the arne time it satisfies the minimum acceptable utilities for all agent ,
then thecontracti weakly coordinating.
• Strong Coordination: lfacontractcouldachievetheequivalenceofagents'opti-
malindividualdeci ions (pure ash equilibrium) and the supply chain's optimal
solution, and at thesaJne time it coulrl rlivide the total supplychainpayoffin
any manner among the agents, then the contract is strongly coordinaling.
The relationship between the two definitions is that if a weakly coordinating contract
is also Aexible, then it is strongly coor<iinatingas well
2.3 Methodology of Coordinating Contracts
The purpose of this section is to provide a taxonomy of supply chain contracting
problems and an overview of methods used in analyzing the coordinalingability of
2.3.1 Classification of Problem
~umerousparameters impact how contract affect collaborative p rformance of supply I
chain agents. However, in order to retain tractability, only a few of those parameters
can be abstracted and invesligated simultaneously ina model. Theresultisaplethora
of models with various combinations of parameters. Here, we present a Ii t of the mostImp,,~; d.,..; of ",,~""m ,"hl,h h.~ boo, 00""'''' I, <h,'" """. ;
J
Supply Chain Topology
A supply chain consists of several busine entities (agents) with certain kinds of Aows
among them (snch as material, information, and money) that can be repre ented by a
network. Despite thecomple.x structure of an average-sized real world supply chain,
the contracting literatnre focuses on small hunks of such networks comprising of
few nodes (representing supply chain agents) and the Aowsbetween them. In many
cases, supply chain contracts are considered to be centered arollnd a focal node and
the immediate predecessors andjorsllccessors which form a hierarchy of tiers. We
refer to this aspect as supply chain topology. The common topologies in supply chain
contracting literature are as follows .
• '!\vo-tier topology with two nodes: Themajorityofstlldies in the supply
chain contracting literatllreconsider this topology. The nodes might represent
a supplier and amanufactllrer, or a prodllcerand a retailer, etc. This topology
resembles a bilaleml monopoly.' The well-known coordinating contracts for
sllpply chains mainly address this topology (see Section 2.4).
• One-tier topology with several nodes: The contracts with this topology
deal with horizontal collaboration among several independent agents that are
in the same supply chain tier (all retailers, or manufacturers for in tance). The
collaboration is through pooling resources in order to balance the 0 utstand-
ingdemandsandsurplusresollrces. In sub-contmcting literature, the Aow of
resources among any two agents are only in one way. However, in the tmnsship-
ment literature, the Aowsare bilateral. Although the agents collaborate with
oneanother,still,they may compete over some aspects of their business, e.g. or-
derquantities (Rudietal.,2001) ortheirmarketsellingprices(ZhaoandAtkins,
2009). An important aspect of the supply chain models with this topology is
whether the collaboration among theagentshappes prior to the reaJizationof
the demand afterwards.
• Two-tier topology with several nodes: The contracts with thi topology
address the interactions among a focal node and several other nodes all being
located in an adjacent tier. Thereforethistopologyiscompriedofeitherone
upstream node that supplies several downstream node, or one downstream
node that is being supplied from several upstream nodes. The nodes in the
same tier may compete with one another over the limited capacity of the other
tier's resources (as in Cachon and Lariviere (1999)), or on market prices (as in
Deneckereetal. (1997)), etc. In more elaborate models the nodes in the same
tier are assumed to pool resource ,e.g. Ulkuetal. (2007).
• More general topologies Assuming more than two tiers in an independently
owned serial supply chain system will drastically increase the complexity of
analysis of coordinating contracts. To the best of our knowledge there are
only a few papers which consider the e topologies. As an example, Zijm and
Timmer (2008) study the coordination problem in athree-ti rsupplychainwith
three nodes. However,theyassumescparatecontractsgoverningtheinteractions
between the node in adjacent tiers.
Supply Chain Environment
The supply chain environment is the collection of external factorsafIectingthesupply
chain 'decisions. Some of the most relevant dimensions of supply chain environment
• Certainty/Uncertainty of environment: Usually, the uncertainty of sup-
ply chain environment refers 0 the market demands. 'I\vo broad categories
are deterministic and stochastic market demands. Sarmaheta!. (2006) review
the contracts with quantity-discount policies in deterministic demand environ-
ment. In deterministic systems, the coordination might pertain to the timing
of orders (Klastorin et a!., 2002). The coordinating contracts with uncertain
market demand environment mostly consider continuous probability fun tion.
An example of coordination with discrete demand distributions is Zhaoet a!.
(2006) which consider a one-tier supply chain with two nodes and Poisson de-
mandarrival rates. Recently, Xu and Zhai (2010) study the general properties
of coordination in a two-tier, two-node topology with fuzzy demands. The other
source of uncertainty about the supply chain environment is associatedwith the
supply chain's input. The supply chain contracting literature has considered un-
certain delivery times (e.g. (Zimmer, 2002)) and uncertain delivered quantities
(e.g. (I-Ieand Zhang, 2008)). The latter is also referred to as mndomyield.
• Sensitivity of environment to supply chain decisions: In Illany supply
chain models, market demands are assumed to be sensitive to omedecision
variables internal to the chain. Among others, the decision on market selling
price and marketing efforts are the most addressed. For example, in addition to
choosingtheordersize,aretailerfacingprice-sensitivemarketdemandshould
also decide its selling price. This, in turn, affects the coordinating ability of
the contract between the retailer and it supplier. Yanoand Gilbert (2005) and
Chanetal. (2004) review the literature on supply chain contracts withpricesen-
itive market demand. When the market demand is affected by the marketing
effort of a downstream agent-which is unverifiable by the chain-a coordinat-
ingcontractshonld induce the supply chain's optimal level of marketingeffort.
Heetai.(2009)explorecoordinatingcontractsforatwo-tier,two-node topology
with both price and marketing effort sensitive market demand. Another factor
that could affect the market demand is the stock le\·ei. Sajadiehetai. (2010)
addressthei ueofcoordinationinthesupplychainwheretheamountofstock
displayed to customer has a positive effect on demand.
• Dependencies among agents in the same tier: The individual decision of
agents who operate in the same supply chain tier may affect each other. These
dependencies add another dimension to the complexity of mod Is. Competition,
and correlated market demands are among factors that amount todependen-
cies among agents in the same tier. Multiple nodes in a particular tier may
compete over their market shares (when they are operating in the same mar-
ket),orsupplier'squotas(whenthesupplier'scapacityisrestricted), or fill
rates. Cachon and Lariviere (1999) investigate the supply chain coordination in
the supply chain where the downstream agents compete over the limited sup-
plier's capacity. Hartman and Dror (2005) analyze the cooperation among many
newsvendors with dependent demands.
Length of Contract
The length of a contract i the duration of time that the contracting agents are
as5umedtoupholdthecontract. Therefore,thecontracttermsarenotre-negolialed
during the length ofa contract. Thishasacrucialeffectonmodelingtheund rlying
upplychain problem. Theeffecti\'elengthofasupplychain~ontractcan be~omparro
with the number of inventory replenishment periods. Accordingly, there is a close
affinity between the length of a 5upply chain contract and the modeling approach.
~I
• Single period models: A large Ilumber of supply chain contracts has been
devisedforthesingleperiodsupplychainmodel,i.e.thenewsvendormodelwith
its numerous variations (l<houja, 1999). Thi family of supply chain mod I
is specially appropriate for the supply chains with perishable products,short
selling seasons, and long procurement lead-times. Nevertheless, the analytical
simplicity of ingleperiodsupplychainmodelshasgivenrietothepopularityof
contracts with one period length. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) outline several
coordinatingcolltract for the standard llewsvendor model. liu etal. (2007)
consider a single period model with Iimitedalld uncertain supplier's capacity.
Cachon (2003) provides an excellellt literature review on coordinatingcontracts
for this family of models. Cachon (2004) addresses coordination in a single-
period model with two replenishment opportunities for the downstream agent.
• Multi-period models: The multi-period models could imply be the combi-
Ilatiolloftwoconsecutivellewsvendormodels (Barnes-Schuster et aI., 2002),01'
they might consist of several stocking periods. The multi-period models are
mainly based on the multi-echelon model of Clark and Scarf (1960). Among the
early papers that address the multi-period supply chain contractsisCachonand
Zipkill(1999)whichoffersacoordinatingcontractbasedontheend-of-period
inventory information at different agents.
Supply Chain Decisions
Among the llumerousdecision variables that are critical in managing supply chains,
the supply chaill cOlltracting literature commonly concentrates on thosethatarere-
lated to capacity, order size, market selling price, marketing efforts, contract type,
lead-times, quality, review period, alld stocking policy. F'or a more detailed analysis
of supply chain decision variablesseeTsayetal. (1999). Considering the multiplic-
ityofdecision makers in decentralized supply chains, an importantaspectofsupply
chain decisions is the distribution ofdeci ion making responsibilities among supply
chain agents. Although traditionally some decision variables are attributed to certain
supplychainentities,e.g.respon ibilityofdecidingtheorder izetothedownstream
agent (buyer), many cases with less conventional approacbes bavealsobeen inves-
tigated in the literature. For example, in an insightful paper Lariviere and Porteus
(2001) assume that the upstream agent chooses the order izewhilethedown tream
agent picks the buying price. Hence, the distribution of decision rights among supply
chain agents falls, at least partially, within the purview of the modeler.
Another aspect of this issue is related to the right of non-compliance among upply
chain agents. Generally, whenever one contracting agent requests something from
another agent, the latter may have the right to not comply with the former's request.
In supply chain contracting literature, theallotmentofcompliancerightsis,in fact,
the choice of the modeler. CachonandLariviere(2001)refertothisissueascompliance
regimen. Accordingly, there are two classes of compliance regimes: voluntary and
forced. CachonandLariviere(2001)usethesetermswithrespecttotheresponsibility
of a supplier to completely fill the manufacturer's order. lnthi context, if the model
gives the supplier the right to decide the fraction of manufacturer'sordertodeliver,
then the system would be under voluntary compliance regimen. In other words,
under voluntary compliance regimen, an agent has the right to decide whether to
fulfill or not to fulfill the requests it receives. Under the forced compliance regime,
on the other hand, an agent is obligated to fulfill the request itreceives.8 Therefore,
whether explicitly or implicitly, the compliance regimens of all the mutual promises
in a supply chain contract should bc indicated. Jfacontractcancoordinate a specific
upplychain setting under a voluntary-compliance regime, it could coordinate under
the forced-compliance regime as well. The opposite might not be the case.
Characterization of Supply Chain Agents
Earlierinthischapter,mtionalityhasbeenaddressedasanllnderlyingcharacteristic
of the agents. T\vo other aspects of SLIPply chain agents' characteristicspertainto
their utility functions and attitlldestoward risk. Utilityfllnction reflect preferences
of agents which, in turn, determine their decision making criteria. In the supply
chain contracting literature, it is conventional to assume that the utilities of agents
are solely a function oflllonetary payoffs. Thatis,agentsonlycareabouttheamount
of profit they make. Nevertheless, there has been a recent trend in considering utility
functions which reflect agents' social preferences as well. For instance, supply chain
agents may also careabolltfaimess in alllutual business relationship (Cui et aI.,
2007). Otherexalllpies inclllde inequity ave,·sion (Cui et aI., 2007) and status seeking
alllongagents (Loch and Wu,2008)
Ind cisionmakingin uncertainenvironlllents, the analysis of agents'decisionmaking
process requires knowledge about their attitudes toward risk. 1\1'0 types of uch
attitudes have been considered in the literature: risk-neutmlity,andrisk-averion.9
For a risk-lleutral agent, a certain payoff of AI is equally preferred as an Wlcertain
payoff with the same expected value !l1, while a risk-averse agent prefers the certain
payoff M. Hence, the objective ofa risk-neutral agent is to ma..ximizeitsexpected
profit (or equivalently to minimize its expected cost). While there is only one measure
for risk-neutrality, risk-aversivenesscan be reflected in many (theoretically infinite)
ways. Among tbe objectives studied for risk-averse agents are the minimization of
variance of profits (Chen and Parlar, 2007)), and the minimization of mean-variance
difference (Gan et aI., 2004; Choi et aI., 200 ). Van Mieghem (2003) reviewed the
literature on capacity investments considering tbe issue of risk-aversion. The general
characteristics of supply chain contracts with risk-averse agents are studied in Gan
eta1.(2004).
Information Structure in Supply Chains
Information structure pertains to the agents' knowledge in comparisontothecollective
knowledge of agents in the supply chain. When all the information about supply
chain is imultaneouly known by every agent, the information structure is said to
be complete or symmetric. On the other hand, if some agents have some information
thattheotheragentsdonot,theinformationstructureisincompleteorasymme17ic.
The piece of information that are known only by an agent is that agent's private
Ingeneral,coordinationunderincompleteinformationismorecolllplex than coordina-
tion under complete information. One approach to deal with incomplete information
structure is to assume certain types of agents each with known characteristics (c.r.
Harsanyi and Selten (1972)). Although tbe agents do not kllOW what types of agents
they are facing, tbeprobabilitythatall wlknown agellt is ofa particular type is as-
sumed to be common knowledge. A coordinating contract in these supply chains is
comprised ofa menu of contracts designed in away tbatwill make the agents with
privateinformationchoosetheonlycontractthatresultinthesupply chain optimum
decisions. Therefore, a coordinating contract in an incomplete information setting
will result in the truthful revelation of private information. Several papers study
supply chain contracts under asymmetric information. Corbett and Tang (1999) as-
sume a two-tier, two-node supply chain with deterministic and price-sensitive de-
mand function where the upstream agent does not know the exact cost structureof
the downstream agent. They investigate the effect of contracts with different pricing
III chanismson the overall efficiency of the chain. Corbett et a!. (2004) study a supply
chain with two agents where thesuppUerdoes not know the retailer's internal cost.
Cachonand Lariviere (2001) analyze a supply chain contracting problem whereth
information regarding the probability distribution of market demand is tbe private
information of the downstream agent. Burnetaseta!. (2007) introduce a coordinating
quantity-di count policy in a two-tier two-node topology where the upstream agent
does not have the information regarding the demand distribution of the downstream
agent. The risk sharing contract ofGan eta!. (2005) can coordinate when tbe up-
stream agent does not know how risk aver ethedownstreamagentis. Burnetasetal
(2007) introduce an all-unit discount poUcy that results in coordinationofatwo-tier
two-node topology supply chain in one period. Sucky (2006) analyzes a two-tier two-
nod supply chain in a deterministic environment under a forced omplianceregimen
Assuming that the upstream agent is uncertain about the downstream agent's cost
structure, he shows that coordination can be achieved through bargaining and with
the help of side payment .
2.3.2 Analytical Methods of Coordinating Contracts
Theabilityofacontracttocoordinateasupplychainiscompletelycontext-dependent.
Contracts can be distinguished at two layers: the contmct template, and tbecontmct
setup. At the outer layer, the contract template provides a holistic view of interactions
among the agents involved in a contract and points out the variablesthatthecontract
isbascdupon. Theserondlayer,i.e. thecontrartsetup,specifiestheparticularsetup
of contract variables for a given contract template. Consider the famous wholesale-
price contract as an example. The contract template declares that the buyer should
paythc ellerafixedpriceforaunitoforderedproduct. Thecontractsetup,onthc
other hand, specifies the exact unit price in the contract. The goal of this section is
to answer two important questions
(1) I-Iowiscontract template obtained? and
(2) How is the coordinating ability ofa contract analyzed?
In most cases, the contract templates are inspired by the structure of contracts which
are being used in practice. The alternative approach requires more creativity; that is,
the modeler invents a contract template by specifying the hypothetical interactions
among the agents. However, justifying the practicality of such a contract templateis
rather challenging. Some of the most well-known contract templates are introduced
Game theor"j is the fundamental tool for investigating the coordinating ability ofa
contract, with specified template and setup, in a given supply chain setting. For a
brief review of related game theory concepts in supply chain contracts see Cachon
and Netessine(2006) andChinchuluunetal. (2008). Accordingly, one should analyze
whether the contract can besetupsothat it could induce all the agents to select the
supply chain's optimal decision, and whether the resultantdivisionschemeofsupply
chain profits are acceptable to them. The latter is addressed in two dift'erent cases
contracts between two agents, and contracts among more than two agents
Contracts Between Two Agents
When there are only two agents involved in a contract, anassessmentofthecoOl'di-
natingability ofacontract should concentrate on two issues: first, the negotiation
process over a contract, and second, theeffectofthenegotiatedcontracton agents' de-
cisions. The most common procedure used in the literature is the Stackelberg game.
This approach simplifies the analysis of negotiation process between the agents by
assuming that one agent (the leader) gives a take-it-or-Ieave-itofl'er, including the
contract template and setup, to the other agent (tbefollower) who has the right to
either acceptor reject the offer. AStackelberg upplychaingamei played as follow .
Anticipating tbe follower's minimum acceptable (expected) profit, the leader offers
a contract setup that (I) induces the follower to choose the upplychain optimum
deci 'ions and (2) result in the follower' minimum acceptable (expected) profit le,·el.
Thi approach is uitablefor ituation where the leader has significantly more power
and the interactions between the agent are restricted. In general, the idea of the
follower either completely accepting the contract or wbolly rejecting it without any
further negotiations may seem toorcstrictive.
Anoth rapproach to analyze the negotiation process over a contra ti to consider an
explicit bargaining process. The bargaining process shall specify th exact contract
setnpwhichieadstoanacccptable plitofthe max.imumsupply chain profits. 'I\voap-
proacheswhich have been used in the literature are Strategic NegotiaLioll(Rubinstein,
192) and Axiomatic Negotiation (Nash, 1950). With Strategic Negotiation (Sequen-
liaIBargaining),afteracontracthasbeenofferedbyanagent,theotheragentcould
offer a new contract (countcr-offer) ifit i not acceptable to the latter. Considering
the value of time (or agent 'patience), this bargaining process has been proven (Ru-
binstein, 192) toconvergetoamutuallyacceptablecontractsetup. For a review of
the implementation of trategicnegotiation in supply chain contracts see Wu (2004).
WithA.xiomatic:\'egotiationapproach, lhebargainingsolution is developed by con-
sideringaxioms that correspond to thed irable properties of negotiation oulcomes.
Th bargaining solution can be thought as the suggestion of an unbiased arbitrator.
Hence, a contract is proven lo be coordinating if the underiying negotiationprob-
lem has a feasible solution. A recentex.8lIlpleofimplementationofthi approa h is
Ilezarkhalli 8lId Kubiak (2010b) which uses lhegeneralized Nash bargaining solution
(rdulhoo,I996)inatran hipping supply chain (see Chapter 3). Nagarajanand ollie
(2008) review tbe literature of bargaining and negotiation in supply chain .
Contracts Among Several Agents
Tbe analysis of coordinating contracts becomes more complex as the number of partic-
ipant in the contract increases. The principle approach to tudythecontraclsamong
several agents is coopemtivegame theory. The cooperative game theory approach to
contract provides mechanism for the distribution of total payoff that is generated
by the coalition of all upplychain agents, i.e., gmnd coalition. The acceptability of
a contract to the agents implies lhat not only should it provide each agent with it
minimum acceptable payoff, but also it must eliminate the incentives for the agents to
form sub-coalitions and gain more profits in that way. In other words, in the n-agent
case,thecoordinatingcontractshouldmeetsomestabilitycriteriawith regard to lhe
distribution ofgranclroalition's payoff among the agents
One of the most natural stability concepts is the concept of core (Peleg, 1995). If
a contract could distribute the grand coalition's payoff among the agent so that no
sul>set of agents could be l>etter off by formingasub-coalition,thenthatdistril>ution
mechanism would be in the core of the corresponding cooperative game. However,it
might be the case that Ilosuch distribution mechanism can be found . levertheless,
therearealternativestabilityconceptslhatcanbeusedinconjunctionwithother
solution concepts in cooperative game lheory, e.g. Shapley value,nueleu ,bargaining
set, etc. (Owen, 1995). Slikkereta1. (2005) study the stochastic cooperative games
with newsvendorswbocan a.lsopool resources through transshipment and show that
the core of this class of supply chain problems is non-empty. Ozen et a1. (2009)
provide a general framework for cooperation under uncertainty. Brandenburger and
Stuart (2007) stndy bi-fonn games. The bi-form games are to model the upply
chains wherein a set of agents face individual ancl correlated c1ecision making problems
followed by a cooperative stage. In a one-tier several agent topology, Anupindi eta!.
(2001) introduceanalJocationrulein the core of the second stage tran hipmentgame.
An alternative allocation rule has been proposed in SuSie (2006) which redistributes
rhcextraprofitgeneratedthroughthetran hipments according w the Shapley \1\lue.
Although the resultant allocation is not necessarily in the core, it could rcsultin the
jarsightcdstability of the grand coalition. i.e. the agents do not form ub-coalitions
since they take into the consideration other agents' reactions as well . Chen and Zhang
(2009) approach the transshipment problem as a two stage cooperative game, and
how that the problem of finrling an allocation in thecoreofn-agent tran hipm nt
game is NP-hard. Hezarkhaniand Kubiak (201Oa) adopted the concept of pair-wise
stability (Baiouand Balinski, 2002), a non-cooperative solution concept derived from
the matching problem in two-sided markets, into the transshipment problem with
many agents (Chapter 4 is an edited version of this paper).
2.4 Well-known Contract Templates for Supply Chains
The typical solution to incompatible incentives in a supply chain i forth agent to
agr<'('toasetoftransferpaymcnt thatmodifiestheirincentives,anrlhcnccmodifies
their b havior (Cachon, 1999). Additionally. the flow of goods and material might
alsobesnbjcctwmodification (asina buyback contract). This section addresses some
of the well-known contract templates in supply chains. \\'e start with one of the most
basic upply chain contracts. i.e. wholesale-price contract, in a basic supply chain
(single-period model with ri k-neutralagent ,independent demands, and symmetric
information structure) and address thecoordinatingcomponentswhich anbeadded
to it in order to achieve coordination in various supply chains.
2.4.1 Wholesale-price Contracts
lnthesimplestsupplychain,thewholesale-pricecontractrequiresth huyertopaya
fixed and quantity-independent price to the seller for each unit purchased. Although
the wholesale-price contract fails to coordinate supply chains in a simple two-tier
topology with two Ilodes,it is the most common cOlltractin practic(~perhapshecause
of its simplicity.
]n lhestandard newsvendorsupplychain, two types of wholesale-price contracts are
possible. First, the downstream agent has to place orders bejOl'e the realization of
uncertain market demand and the upstream agent provides products accordingly
Second, thedownstreamagentcanplaceitsorderafterobservingtheactuaI market
demand while the upstream agent should prepare itself in advance for meeting it.
Although in both cases the integrated system is a standard newsvendor model, they
are different with respect to allocation ofri kbetween the two agents. Cachon (2004)
calls the first type push and second typepullwholesale-pricecontracts. Lariviere and
Porteus (2001) analyze the properties of push wholesale-price contracts where the
upstream agent can satisfy all the downstream agent's orders and it acts as the Stack-
elberg leader offering the wholesale price to the downstream agent who determines
the order quantity. Note that with this contract, the seller gets a risk-less sum of
money before realization of market demand and the buyer faces all the risk associated
with the uncertainty market demand. Cachon and Netessine(2004) analyze the pull
contract where the upstream agent has to decide its capacity levelbeforereceivingth
downstream agent's orders. As the authors conclude, both types of wholesale price
contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain. In fact, the only wholesale-price in the
push setting which induces the downstream agent to place the optimal centralized
order size, leaves the upstream agent with no profit, thus, the wholesale price con-
tract cannot satisfy the acceptability condition of coordination,i.e., it cannot result
2.4.2 Contracts with Discount Policies
Discount policies, i.e. quantity-dependent unit prices, are well-known coordinating
components in supply chain contracts. There are several formsofdiscoullt policies;
see Dolan (19 7) for a review. Discount policies are the main coordinating components
in supply chains with deterministic demand. Jeuland and Shugan (19 3) address the
problem of coordination in the two-tier two-node topology lmd propose a coordinat-
ingquantity-discountcontract. Astbeysbow,thereareseveralcoordinatingquantity
discount contracts which lead to different plit schemes for extra profitsgeneratcd
through cooperation. I<lastorin et al. (2002) consider a two-tier supply chain with
one upstream agent and several down tream agents and show a discount poli ythat
can coordinate the ordering times of downstream agents so thaL the supply chain can
save holding costs at the upstream level. Cachon (2003) incorporates the quantity
discount component in a standard newsvendor supply chain and demonstrates its
coordinating ability in a two-tier topology with two nodes. In hi model, tbe mutu-
ally acceptable division of supply chain profit is determined bya:\ash bargaining
mechani m between the two agents.
2.4.3 Contracts with Return Policies
Withthereturnpoliciesthesellerpromiestocompensatethebuyerforunsoldquan-
tities. One might ask why contracts with return policies are needed while quantity
di count contract are just as well coordinaling. First,
[b]uy-back payments play a very important role in channel coordina-
tion when the multi-retailer supply chain is considered.
erve markets of different sizes, the manufacturer can attain the profits
ofacoordinated channel only ifhe can charge different wholesale prices
to each outlet. However, in the US such a practice is restricted by the
Robinson Patman Act which protects the retailers against price discrimi-
nation by the manufacturers. It is shown that the buy-back paymentsfor
used products provide a second degree of freedom forthemanufacturerto
difl'erentiate the average wholesale price charged to each retailoutlet,and
thereby attain the coordinated channel profits in a decentralized supply
chain. (Deboetal., 2004)
Second,withthereturnpoliciestheupstreamagentisalsobearingthe risk associated
with the market demand so the downstream agent prefers it to a quantity discount
contract with the same expected profit.
The variations of return policies depend upon the amount of leftover inventory which
can be returned and the amount of compensation-the ratio of unit compensationfee
to the original purchase price. Pasternack (1985) shows that in a single-period supply
chain with risk-neutral agents, the return policies that allow for full leftover return
and partial compensation can coordinate the supply chain. Other variations of return
policies are (1) unlimited return and fuIJcompensation, (2) limited return and full
compensation,and (3) limited return and partial compensation. Inthenewsvendor
supplychain,Pasternack(I985)alsoprovesthatthereturnpoliciesthat allow for full
return and full compensation cannot be coordinating. In the same setting, Cachon
(2003)showsthatpartialreturnandfullcompensationpolicycannotbecoordinating,
while partial return and partial compensation call. Su (2009) study the impact of
full returns policies and partial returns policies Oil upply chain performance. He
demon trates that con umer returns policies may distort incentives under common
supply contracts and propoesstrategies to coordinate the supply chain.
2.4.4 Revenue Sharing Contracts
In revenue sharing contract ,thedownstreamagentcommit to return a pre-negotiated
portion of its realized profits to the upstream agent. The successful implementation
of these contracts is reported in the \'ideo rental indu try (Cachon and Lariviere,
2005). The revenue haringcontract can also coordinate tbe price- nsitivenewsven-
dol' supply chain (Cachon and Netessine, 2(04). Qin and Yang (200) con ider a
two-tier. two-node topology and analyze the revenue sharing contract as a Stackel-
berg game and conclude that, in order to achieve coordination, theagent that keeps
more than half the revenue should serve as the leader of the Stackelberggame. Yao
et al. (2008b) study a two-tier, three-node topology where the downstream agent
comp·te over setting the market selling prices. They combine the Stackelberg game
among the upstream and downstream agents and the Bayesian Nash game betw en
the two downstream agents and investigate the effect of different revenue-sharing eon-
tractsonsupplyehainperformance
A particular case of revenue sharing-widely known as consignment contracts (Wang
et aI., 2004)-is the in tance where the ownership of goods do not change with their
d livery to the downstream agent, i.e. the upstream agent remains the owner. Then,
the up tream agent pays tbe downstream agent a commission for each sold item.
\\'angetal.(2oo.J)investigatetheperformaneeofconsignmentcontraet,i.e.supplier
and retailer's respccti\'e shares of total profit, when the demand i sen itive to the
market selling price.
2.4.5 Rebate Contract
In rebate contracts, the upstream agent rewards thedownstrearn agent fore\' ryunit
sold. Therefore, in some sense, a rebate policy resembles a return policy: while in
buyback contracts the downstream agent is compensated for un old units, in rebate
contracts the latter is rewarded for the units sold. Accordingly, different rebate policies
can be implemented: (1) policies that reward for all units sold, and (2) policies that
reward for sold units only above a threshold. In single-period supply chains, Taylor
(2002) shows that the second class of rebate policies can achieve coordination. Chen
etal. (2007) consider the rebate contract in a two-tier, two-node topology with price-
sellsitivedemaudsaud find that the mail-in rebates (which is payCf! upon request) may
benefit the upstream agent while instant-rebates (which includes every interaction)
may not..
2.4.6 Contracts with Side Payments
Although the notion of side payment has a clear definition in game theorylO, its use
in supply chain contracting literature is somewhat inconsist nt". We define side
payments as the lump-sum monetary transfers among the contracting agents which
are independent of amount of trade and used as compensation and incentivealignment
mechanisms. In order to clarify tbe issue consider two contracts introducedearlier: the
wholesale-price, and the revenue sharing contracts. In tbe wbolesale-price contract,
the amount of money transferred from tbebuyer to tbeseller isa linear functionof
units purchased. On theotherhand,inthe revenue sharing contract thedownstream
agentpaystheupstrealllagelltalump-sulllofmoneyaftertberealizatiOll of its profits.
According to this definition, the latter is aside payment while theformerisnot.
Examples of side-payment contracts among two agents inrlude two-part tariff (where
limited side-payments are allowed, e.g. Zaccour (200)) and option contracts (.g.
Barnes-Schuster et a1. (2002)). In general, the contracts that rely on allocations of
realized profits take advantage of side payments. Hence, almost all the contracts
with more than two contracting agents, which utilize profit-allocation mechanisms,
are contracts with side payments. Although the inclusion of side paymenls in supply
chain contracts could facililatecoordination, tbey may beinfeasiblein omesituations,
e.g. in some cases they might be prohibited bylaw (Lengand Zhu, 2009).
2.5 Literature Review and Discussion
This section classifies the recent literature on coordinating supply chain contracts
The classification scheme has been explained in earlier section The papers wherein
the analysis does not result in coordination have not been considered. The liter-
ature review is presented through extensive tables (Table 2.1 and 2.2). In order
to summarize the information in the tables, we use the following notation. In the
Topology column, the xT/yN represents the number of tiers and nodes of the topol-
ogy. For instance, 2T/2N represents two tiers with two nodes topology. In the Con-
tract Length column, x-p shows the number of periods in the model (n-pstandsfor
multiple-periods). In the Agent Characteristics column, Risk-N and Risk-A repres nt
risk-neutral and risk-averse agents respectively.
The large number of variables that can be included ill analyzing the contractual sit-
uation limits the comprehensiveness ofthisclassificatioll scheme. 10reover,several
other important aspects of supply chain contracts canllot bequantitativelyanalyzed.
ome of those aspects are: theapplimbility,i.e.thepossibilityofimplementationofa
contraclinagivenrealworidcontext,theverijiabilitY,i.e.availabilityofmechanisms
for verifying the lateral promises stated in the contract, and the easeoJimplementa-
tion,i.c.theeffortwhichisrequiredtoapplyacontractinrealworid supply chains. In
fact,lhereisno kllown measure to compare coordinating contracts for specific supply
Table 2.1: Supply Chain Contracting Literature
T,bl, 2.2, S""I, Chm" C,,"I.ocbo, L"".com (Oml'd) I
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One of the weak points of coordinating supply chain contracts is their sensitivity to
context. In thi respect. the over· implificationofaproblem may result inseriou
flaw. [n fact, tbesupplycbain contra ts which coordinate in a particular theoretic
"upplychain (under certain implification'), may lead toverydifferentr ult"when
implemented in real world situations. Cachon and I<ok (2010) show that well·known
coordinating contracts such as quantity·discount and two-part tariffs could wor n
lhe performance of supply chain when applied in a two-tier topology with multiple
competing suppliers. Accordingly, one should be very cautiou when implementing
these insights into practice.
A common assumption in the supply chain contracting literature is that the process
of contracting does not have any sib'11ificant costs. However, there me several cost
associated with the contracting process, e.g. costs related to writing down the con·
tracts and their monitoring and enforcements costs. In addition, theliteratmedoes
not consider the costs that the contracting agents incur in order to collaborate with
eahother. Many studies have shown that cooperation among supply chain agent
requires costly infrastructure for information sharing, process and resourcecoQl·dina·
tion, and performance measurem nls (c.f. ~lcLaren et al. (2002)). Therefore, without
considering uchrealisticcosts, the practical benefit ofcoordinatingconlractswould
be unclear and inconclusive. The research must find the conditions under which ad·
ditional profits which result from implementing a coordinating contract are actuall ,
significant. Cbapter5inthisthesi incorporatestheconceptofcooperationcotsinto
lheanaly isoftran bipmentsinsupplychain
Despitelhegro\\~ngnumberofanalytiC81sludiesonsupplychaincontracts,lhereare
onlyafewempiricalstudiesaimingatvalidalionofthetheoreticalprediction inlhis
area. In a laboratory study, l<atokallCl Wu (2009) show that the effect of coordinating
contracts on supply chain elliciency isslIlaller than what ispre<licted analytically. On
the other hand, the small numherofempirical research papers in this area almost
certainlyindicatesthattheactualdecisionmakingprocessinsuppIychains is hugely
influenced by bounded rationality, anchoring, experience, and insullicientlyadjusted
heuristics (e.g. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), Bolton and Katok (200), and Ben-
zion et al. (2008)). Additionally, the empirical studies of supply chain contracts do
not reach beyond the laboratory tests-perhaps due to the sensitivityofnecessary
The main focus of this thesis is coordination in transshipment problems. Table 2.3
depicts thecontrihutions of different chapters of this thesis to the existing literature on
supply chain contracting, according to the proposed c1assi6cationscheme. Chapter 3
addresses a single tier supply chain problem with two agents. Under the assumption
of risk neutrality, we propose a contract which, drawing upon an implicit pricing
mechanism, coordinatestheproduction/lnventoryquantities. Chapter 4 studies the
transsllipment prohlem with n agents. The decision variable to coordinate i again
production/inventory quantities. Finally, Chapter 5 address the coordination in n-
agent transshipment problem with positive cooperation costs
The following chapter is an editedve1' ion of:
B. lIezarkhani and W. Kubiak. A coordinating contract for tran hipment in a two-
company supply chain. Eumpean Journal of Opemtional Research, 207(1):232-237,
Chapter 3
Coordinating Transshipment
Problem With Two Agents
Summary: This chapler sludies a supply chain wilh lwo indepen-
den I agenlsproducing/07-dering an homogeneous producl andcoopemling
lhroughlmnsshipmenl. Previou sludiesofthischainshowthatonlyunde,-
eel-lain conditions, linea,-lmnshipmenlpricescouldbefoundlhalinduce
lhe companies loehoose lhe fir I beslproduetion quantities. M01Y;over,
even if such tmnsshipmentprices do exist, they resuit in a unique division
oftotalexpectcdprofitandthustheycannotaccommodateal-bitmrydivi-
sions of the profit. U. ing the Genemlized Nash Bargaining Solution, we
derivecoordinatingtmnshipmentpricesthatalwaysgiverisetoacoordi-
nating contmct for the dlain_ Thi contmct relies on an implicit pricing
3.1 Introduction
Generally, cooperation between agents in a upply chain falls into two major cate-
gories: vertical and horizontal. The vertical cooperation is defined as concerted prac-
tices between agents operating at different levels of supply chain, e,g, manufacturer-
wholesaler, upplier-retailer(Cruijssenetal.,2007), Most of the previous research on
supply chain contracts addresses vertical cooperation, In wholesale p,ice contracts,
the seller offers a wholesale price to the huyer, If the buyer accept the contract, it
will pay the seller for each purchased unit (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001), Quantity
discount contracts are generally imilar to the wholesale price contracts except that
the seller offers a price which is dependent on the buyer's order quantity (seeCachon
(2003)), [n buyback contracts the seller offer a ontract with a fixed unit price along
with a buyback nnit price, With this contract, the buyer pays the seller for each
unitpurchased,andaftertheresolution of uncertainties, thesellercompensatesfor
the buyer's unsold units (Pasternack, 1985), In ,'evenue shming contracts, the buyer
l' ceivesa unit wholesale price (which is less than its marginal cost) before the real-
izationofdemand,and then it gets a portion of retailer's profit aftertherealization
of demand, Except for the who[esale price contract, the rest oflhese contracts can
be designed as coordinating contracts
On theotherhand,thehori7.ontalrooperation i defined as therollaboration between
agents operating at the same level(s) in the supply chain, e.g. l'etailers,distrihu-
tOI'S, or transportation agencies (Cruijssen et aI., 2007). An instance of horizontal
cooperationistmnsshilJment. Whenever agents have to stock up their resources in
anticipation of uncertain demands, they might end upintwosituations. First, in case
of high demands they enroullter ullsatisfied demand which rauseseither lost sales or
backorder costs. Second, in case of low demands, they confront the costs of surplus
reources, e.g. holdingcoslsor reduced sale prices. By transshipment an agent has
the chance to use another agent's surplu resourceswheneveritfacesunsatifiedde-
mand. Anexampleofthispracticeisdiscernibleintheoilindu try where volatility
of demands and limitation of regional refinery capacities make tran hipmentarea-
sonable practice (Dempster eta!., 2000). The popularity of this practice is growing
thank to advances in information and communication technologies. To the best of
our knowledge, pre,'iou research does not provideanyeoordinating ontractfor the
tran hipment problem. Thi chapter proposes uch aeontracl fora upply chain
with two agents.
The main question addressed in thisehapter is the e.xistence of transshipmentpriees
(a) rational agentsean agree upon prior to the realization of demands ; and
(b}giverisetothecoordinationofproducliondecisions
We use the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (Roth, 1979; Nagarajan and Sosic,
200 } to develop a model for the negotiation over the division of totaI expected profit
resulting from the agents' cooperation. We prove that there exist a contract for
determiningthetransshipmentprices\Vhicheoordinatestheproduetiondecisions,and
also di"ides the total expected profit between the agents based on their bargaining
powers. Our approach implies that thiseontraet must have two rounds (see Figure
3.1). In the first round, the agents accept a condition, i.e. a pricing formula \Vhi h
isan implicit functioll of their qualltity decisions, fordetermini ng the transshipment
prices\Vhich is an implicit function oflatcr decisions on their productionquantities.
In the econd round,after the agents individually made their production decision ,
the' fix the negotiated transshiplllent prices by selecting them among aII the possible
coordinating transshipment priees. The pricing mechanism in this contract i ,in fact.
an implicit pricing mechanism. We how that the proposed eontraet is a coordinating
! .
'--- ,.-----~~ ./ T"",
Stage two
Figure 3.1: Sequence or Action in the Proposed Two-agent Conlract
Ther torthischapleri organized as rollows. Section 3.2 provides a brier literature
reviewalldlhechapler'smotivation;Section3.3presentsthebasicrrameworkandno-
tation; Section 3.4 rormulates the mathematical modelorthetransshipmentproblem;
Section 3.5 illustrates the details orth proposedcolltract; ection3.6comparesour
mechanism with the mechanism previously proposed ror thi problem; and finally,
Section 3.7 contains concluding remarks.
3.2 Literature Review
Horizontal cooperation has been explored pr viously in different rorms, e.g
lractingandoutsourcing (Van Mieghem, 1999), laleral capacity or resourcee.xchange
(Chakravarty and Zhang, 2007; Krajewskaet aI., 2007), and lransshipment. There
are two main strearnsor res arch in lhe lransshipment problem. Inlheexpo tlrans-
shipment, it is assumed that the tran hipment i donearter the demand realization
(Krishnan and Rao, 1965; Tagaras, 19 9; Herer and Rashit, 1999; Rudi et aI., 2001; Hu
etal.,2(07). The olher stream assumes that agents transship based on their updated
demand rorecastsand berore the observation or actual demands, Le., exantelrans-
shipment (Das, 1975; Gross, 1963; Chod and Rudi, 2(06). We rocu on the rormer in
this chapter
Traditionally, most or the research on the transshipment problem assume a centml-
ized supply chain with a single decision maker (Krishnan and Rao, 1965; Tagaras,
199; Hererand Rashit, 1999). In tbe decentmlized supply chain, agent areowned
or managed independently, and there are potential conflicts of interest . Thus, the
main instrument for analyzing the decentralized supply chains becomes game theory.
Perhaps one of the first papers wbich utilize tbe game tbeory concept in operation'
management context is Parlar (19 ). He developed a model for the single-period
transshipment problem and derived the ordering quantities u ing the ash Equilib-
rium. However, this research does not consider any transshipment pricesoth r than
the market selling prices.
Using game theory in a decentralized supply chain, Van Mieghem (1999) examines the
subcontracting problem where an agent can usetbesubcontractor'scapacitywhen its
demand exceeds its own capacity. lie analyzes the initial investment decisions un-
c1er thrceclifferent contract types: price-only contracts, incompietecontracts, ancl
tate-c1epenclent price-only contra ts. Inhisanalysisofthestate-depnclentprice-
only contracts (statesaredefinccl with respect to the actual c1emancls) hesuggctsa
mcchanism for c1eriving the transshipment prices that can result in theinitialinv t-
ment levels which maximize the centralized profit. However, with his state-dependent
price-only contracts, the determination of the transshipment prices requiresknowledge
Rudi et a\. (2001) study a single-period tran hipment problem with two independent
retailer. Theyderivethetransshipmentpricesthatcausetheindependentretaiiers
to choose tbesupply chain optimal production/order quantities. Jlowe\'er.lluetal.
(2007) prove that such transshipmentpricesmayexistonlyundercertainconditions,
lhusnotalways. Therefore, lIueta\. (2007) conclude tbat
firms that would like to coordinate multiple locations may have to
resort to other mechanisms than solely relying on linear transshipmen
prices(p.1294).
This conclusion motivates the development of the implicit pricing mechanism in thi
chapter. Moreover, even i[such transshipment prices exist, they lead to a singular
division of total expected profit that might be unacceptable to at I ast oneofth
agenls. Hence, these lransshipment prices do not give rise to a coordinating con-
tract according to Cachon's definition. In tead of assuming exogenou tran .hipment
pric , wemadel then gotiation m'er the total expected profit resulting from coop-
erationbetweenagent. We propose acoordinaling contract wilh an implicit pricing
mechanism that always leads to the first best quantities being the 1 ash equilibrium,
and accommodates the division of total expected profit according LO theagenls' bar-
gaining powers. Finally, we show that the agents may have several choiccswhen fixing
the transshipment prices.
An alternative approach to coordinate the transshipment problem employscoopera-
livegam theory. This approach advocates lhat once the agents ha\'edecided their
quantiliesandthemarketdemandhasbeenob rved,theyformcoalitions,lran hip
the urplus, if any, and diyide the extra profits resulting from the tran hipment.
Anupindielal. (200l) provide an allocation rule based on the dual prices of residuals,
i.e.lhedualallocation rule, in the core of corresponding cooperative game. Still, as
Huang and Sosi6 (2010b) show, the dual allo ation rule is unable to coordinate the
genralsupplychainwithtwoagents
Although most of the previous research on upplychaincontractsllsetheStackelberg
game for analyzing tbe dynamics between the parties (see Cachon (2003)),thischapter
uses lhe concept of Generalized Nasb BargainingSollllion. Therationaleislhatprior
10 lherealization of demand , neither agent know ifit hasunsali fied demand-or
surplllsproducts. Therefore,lheSlackelberggameisnotsuitableinthesupplychain
whereneilheragenthassom distinctive characteristics for being the leo.der. Clearly,
if the agents wait until they receive some updated information aboutth irdemand,
they might be able to later distinguish the leader as theseUer (oralternatively as the
buyer) as in Chakravarty and Zhang (2007).
3.3 Notation and Framework
Consider a system with two ri k-neutral newsvendor agents (i,j = 1,2) producing an
homogeneous product (i*j throughout the chapter). The agents decide their pro-
duction/order quantities, X = (X"X2 ), prior to the realization of random demands,
D = (D" D2 ). The D has a bivariate continuous and twice differentiable density func-
tion with its support on positivereals. The unit production costs, selling prices, and
salvage values are denoted by c = (C"C2), r = (1",,1"2), and v = (1/1,1/2) respectively
We assume 0 ~ v < c < r. The agents are penalized at the rate h = (hl,h2 ) for each
We study a single-period model with two stages. At the heginning of stage one, agents
agree on the way to set the transshipment prices, s = (SI2,S2d, where S'2 is the unit
price that 2 should pay in order to receive a unit of1's surplus product. The agents
decide their quantities individuaUyand independently afterwards. At the beginning
of stage two, demands are realized and agents carry out thetransshipments. Wheni
transships toj, the former incurs a unit transportation cost, t;j~O. Let t= (t'2,t2,)
To assure that the tran hipmentoccur only if one agent has unsatisfied demands
and the other has surplus, it is commonly assumed (see Rudi et al. (2001) for example)
that e; <cJ+tj ;" 1/; <I/J+tj;, andr;+h;<rJ+hj+tj ; fori,j= 1,2. The transshipment
is feasible if neither agent is worse off by doing it. From thetran hipment-receiver
agent's viewpoint, atranssllipment price is feasible if it is less than or equal to the
market selling price plus the lost sale penalty. Fromthetransshipment-sencleragent's
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• buplni,,& dulioo der;.'!'d bot· D\"m« I.... follow;,,& ~"'-em .
.-IofnO<1<liltbeplayerl·lblrpullUCpolf'eraDdl-..,,,,plare2 bIrpIwuc
power (Roth. 1979) :"'oc.el...linlhllllnOdfoll.... ..,i5MIUIIIMIO .... kaooo"ll.prwrL
~ Dulillll 10 ( ) is railed I.... Gmerali1ed '\asb &rpuu,,& SoIU11011 (G\BS)
(l\lIpnojlllandswt,2lXl8j
3.5.1 The Implicit Pricing ro.·h.'Chanism
In (38). liet u,' JiJC(I,Xj .."d 'I. I J;"C{X{"C) for ,.1.2. ObMn'l' Ihl,t [or "II
" W'1 h",... J,VC(S,XNC) ~ J,NC(X:'C). Thlls. there are al""l\YlI II lind X ~ueh thnt
J/)C(I.X) ~ J:'C(xt'·Cj. For tholie I "nd X the GNBS ellll be rormulilted M
Lemma 3.1 (TheG:"'BScondition). Fo,," .."X./Mlra......JIipmrnl pri«611i1i€A#OI«
(!.9).•·.('i.,Si,). Hlu!rIk/"U,II"u,ccwuhtioft
r ..(x)l;,-r.,{x)o.i,-{'l'(" .....).(1 ')(r" .... )]rlJ(X)-j(I-')(., ••,J.'t{ln ....)]rn(X)
•·,P,""(Xd - J,""(X."")]- (I _ ,)[Jj"c(XI) 4 J,"'<;(Xi")]
PrtJoI F'"U5l. _ DOl., tbat (3_9) II ronao,.., 011. (eee AppeDdts:). If bod' r,.(X) aDd
r.,(X) ...., IIOllZft'O. lbe G:-OBS rood'llOO nUl .... obw-.l b\ If\u,,« .,nbK 01.1....
litIl ordercoodmoo", ..bidI .... pr<:l'nIkd In 11•., proofolooaor:aV'll)" ol{J91 In I....
Appendix. to aero and sohll,& h. lfrllhet of the r ..(X) and r,,{X) "wro.lht"n
r1t ...... of t .... lirlIt order condltMlM ill .1.....)11 J:I'ro 'lid I.... GSDS con<lJllOII can be
obtained by setting the other equation to zero and solving it.
ote that the transshipment prices which meet the G BS condition in (3.10) are im-
plicit functions ofX. Therefore, s'(X) is an implicit pricing mechanism. This implies
a two-round contract detailed in Figure 3.1. In round one, theagentsaccepts'(X)
and thenindividuallydecidetheirquantilies; in round two, theyfixlhetransshipment
prices by selecting a point using the implicit pricing mechanism. By Lemma 3.1, for
any X, if both rdX) *0 and r 21 (X) *0, the agents will have several alternatives
for fixing s·(X) since S;2(X) and S21 (X) lie on the line defined by (3.10). However, if
either r'2(X) =0 or r 21 (X) =0 (but not both), then one of the transshipment prices
disappears from the equation (3.10) and consequently there will be only one choice
for s·(X). The case with r'2(X) =r 2,(X) =0 is trivial because then neither agent
expects any transshipments. The resultant transshipment prices will be referred to as
the negotiated tmnsshipmentpdces
3.5.2 Deciding the Quantities
When individuaJlydeciding their quantities, the agents wldergoagame.
dividual optimum quantities are thus determined by the Nash equilibrium, XDC =
(XPC, XfC). which is the intersection point of the agents' reaction junctions l2 (Fu-
denbergand Tirole, 2002).
Rudi et al. (2001) argue that there isa unique set of linear tmnsshipment pdce
(transshipment prices that are fixed before the decisions on production/orderquan-
lities has heen made) that results in the Nash equilibrium being equal to the first
best quantities. I-Iuetal. (2007) refute this claim by proving that these special linear
transshipment prices do not necessarily exist (weshaUreturn tothei rcounter-example
in Section 3.6). Moreover, even if such lineartransshipmentpricesdoexist,theycan
12A reaction fUllctiolispecifictilhedecisiollofanagentasafuncLiono( otheragcnts'cJccisiolls.
only d,vide the sUI,ply dlldlll>rolit bel,"",,-~' Ihe agenls in {>I'e "....y for there;~ .. {>I'e-
l(}-oneC'OlTOlpor~bet""ffnlinearln\}}""hipmc"tpriccsandchcdi"",ioI,oftotal
We 'lOW show that "'ilh the Implicit prici,,& mechanism. for an}" rombilUllio<> of bar-
Vi;ni'liP'O"'Cf"$. lhf:o pille IO!leIc<:t cH:qUllmitiell..nm,sre;uI"'in t""liM beoc
quantltia
Lemma 3.2. 11·1th a'(X). the op«leJ. ,nd",iJ...J,..,/ih .....
Proof At Ihcpolnta'(X),(3 ..4)c:an be re"'Tinni ali
Sublhllltmc (3.10) III (3.13) oncobtPlli (311). By appl)ins che ......., ...-o-lu~ 10
(H) ....... c:an&et (312) o
t.cn""'1 32 SUI.,. , ..., "ilh a'(X)., ""~ iodi'i<llIIl profic for nd> Il.l'tlI
fqlll1llUI' IlIaXUllwD t'XJlC'CIa\ profil in I~ OOll-('(>(lfMnli,,,, 1J>Od.o. J;'C(X,"C). p1U1i I
fno:t>Ollbroravnllllld I "rorlf>Cnc'l)of""ll«'tcd""traprufic'''lUlt"",fruU>
the coop...racion. I .... JJX'(X) - J;C(X ve). We h.o.''l' I~ 1'oIk....;1l& tllOO"'lII
TheoI'Cm 3.1. II",thl'(X), XllC.X-.
Proof Theq""",' retlCUOllfllllCtio<UlUeX,r>c .. llrJ!tx":"",J,OC'(X)for'.J .. I,'l 1l>e
tIOlul}(}r1lothe~)'MrnofliMor(korronditi0n8,
{OJIOC(X"lIOX, O.OJ,PC'(X,s)/OX, .o},
isth... l"lWlbequilibrium lJysul:oitituting (31l) snd (312) a"dsiml,lificatooll, the
Thesolutioll to the IMt s)'l>telll is Xc.
Th'l~. if the implicit prIcing mechaubm is implememoo, ,he N""h equilibrium qUlin·
liti..... equalsth.. firstbeslqusntities
3.5.3 Fixing the Negotiated Transshipment Prices
shipllle"t pl'ices--acoord'''g 10 the imp~<:it pricing ",,,,,ballism in (3.IO)-so that they
s.hlo ",eet the f<'&l;bility rollditions gi,e'll" (3.1). Let nIX) be the set of all ~uch
tra"sship'"eutpnCC'!foragi'"eT1X
Let"",,, 3.3. Foro given X,
!"l1ll«l."lll .... )S.i,Smill(l..-"r, • lid i!f ll (Xj.Oondf.. (X).On(x)~ 1",,,,s'i,sT,.h, ,jfll(Xj.Oondf.,(X).O1'2'''1 S.j,s').h2 i/f,,(X).O ondr,,(X)~O(3.14)
l.'--1(Tl'h,-1'2-"I)~::i~: .(1 1)(Tl.lId·l(12'· ... )
1[J{C(X,)_Jfc P::jVC)]_ (l-l)lJtC(X,) -Jtc(xjc)]
r2,(X)
L, -(1-1)('11' h, -1,,-"1) ~::~~; • (1-1)(T,. htl '1('2' .... )
l[Ji'"C(X,} - JjVC(X{C)]_ (l -l)[Ji"C(X,) - Jtc(xtC)]
r ll (X)
(3.l{>j
Proof "(X) II delinfd by tM C"6S coo(lltlOO .nd 1M r-billly C'OllIIfaUlto lOr
tho- I ....._il''''''...~ For tho- lil'lt ~, ...b5"t"tu~ I"" 'i, from tM c"as
C<Diilion ialot'" .......bilityccm.11OO for 't1. t"'"(X)~t"',Dl~ionoi
L,S.Ji,sL,and",-/o'JS"i,sr,-II,_Tbe"tlft"isequ,,~1.o
nlQ(L,.ll' -/o'J)S'i,SIII'n(L,.r, _h,)
The"'-""lllKI,,"d thinlClL'll'llfollO'N""IlIIe<l\~1l11}'
Notethlll ""hcneitlKYr,,(X)_oorr, ,(X)_OlhcfC3SibiJityOOlKlltiollin(J 1)!IOlcIy
det.en"iUCl!lI ... bot"Idaries.IIO'Me\.......·I....,bothr"(X)andr,,(X)~poIili'~.Ihf,
C"UScon(IlUOllftlroroell further m>tnrtion on tbe boundariol. The 1'QUo,.'1IJ tl......-nD
............. th.lt f<wthloli...... br6ll q<W!"t""".lf Xc. re.sible IloI'pJIlatrotralaluplDeIll
price,CIJ,<lln,,"'foond
Theorem 3.2. "(XC) iI lIOn-nnpt,
~f A>il;ume llllot rn(X). O..1Ii r ll(x). 0 lu Of'<kor to~ llllot "(XC) is
nOll-f'llllll}'.itill.llllkinlltoshowlhat
II",~(L,.I., _ .... ) c mill(L".r, + h,)
for X _ XC From thcafi6Umpl.;olls rJ.our model.•~ ]('lO"'·lh.ll .. _", < r, + II,
and fll-/o'J<r, _h,_ Thisdi~l)' MIlllUin L. <L,. Toshoor tlllot L, <r,_h, is
"-eC&lllieelhat I" .... <1.". ~ow~that r,,(X)_O 11IthlilfUe,itlll'O'dslO
IlMed 01' the previou!! p"'rt, lhe proof II stNlightfO""lIrd. The Clt.'>ewh"r" r~,(X)·O
Whet....''eftl~.re'''ultjpLepollllibililioiforlJ('lc<:tillgthl'trllllilllhjp'''( ..,tpri<'e8.tl....
<iloiN'lllllOll&lllt-mdo!>o'anotaff""1lhcoi"'h\'ldual ....Jl""'todprofiu.lId<'1lll~dont
arbitraril}' and ~bly br 1Ismg. --.llldat)· mletiocl. for l,*~ thl- ,~ol
1~"«ftlu·lndJndualprotit&.
o.,,,,,,,ldOistribution
SeIIin,;Pri""
1.....1 Sale l'enalty
TrausjlorUt.tio" Coot
SAlvage Value
U"iICootol'l'roductio"
TrUl>ratedNonll.lllOist,(IOO,50)
'1*20
~,_ 5
1,,·6
vl*8
(,.\0
Agelll2
TrunealedNonll.lllOist,(200,IOOj
..,.25
hp8
1,,-6
""'<':1-12
Tahle3.l: De.criptionof Exa"'l,le I
Optimumq.....nliti..
~l"";n",m Indi>i<Jual Expected Profit
MlLXilllum Total F.xpected I'ro/it (O:lItnhzed)
lIthle 3.7: Example I: The Outcollle in Ihe :'\on·Cooper/tth." Mode
51>('(;i,,1 ense: 5ytmnetric Agents
For \"'0 completely sytlHudric agell\.'!, I.e. wl"," all the parameters "'i ",,11 as the
bargaining l'O""rsareequal,"" ha,,,
ill (3.IO), Therefore, whelllheagell1sfix the trall,!lIIhipmetll l>rirt"8. tl",y.a" al""')"5
pick,loe'uC<Jual
which isindepend"nloflherealizalionofdemallds
3.5.4 An Example
eon.idertlOo'Oaget,\.'!dcscribedill TlIble 3.1. Wetl&i'''"ethIHlhe)' ha,."illdepe"dcnt
tru"eatre Nonnal demand distribuliom. Table 3.2 )ieloh their CJ<1~led profits in tile
tlQll-«>OpCTllli\'emOOe.llltheooopct1lli\"ClllQl\e,lhellcgotiatedtl'\llUlljhiplllemprice!!
Optimum Quantities (Centralized) xf = 1 1.14 xf =269.01
Maximum Total Expected Profit (Centralized) J.fC(XC) =31 1.1
Table 3.3: Example 1: Centralized Solution
meet lhe foUowingG\'BS condition:
r'2(X)si2-r21(X)S21 =23.5rI2(X)-20r21(X)+~[j!IVC(X2)-JIVC(XI)-1326.661. (3.16)
Table 3.3 shows the optimum quantities and the total expected profit in the cen-
lralized snpply chain. By Theor m 3.1, the optimum individual quantities with tbe
negotiated transsbipmentprices in (3.16) are those in Table 3.3. ext, th agents
couldchooseaspecificsetoftran hipmcnt prices by picking any p inton the line
Si2-0.074s21 =19.435 with 15SS21 S25 (e.g. s'=(20.915,20)).
3.6 Linear versus Implicit Pricing Mechanism
Wc are now ready to illustrate the difference between the linear pricing mechanism
presented by Rudietal. (2001) and Buetal. (2007), thedualaJlocation mcchanism
of Anupindi et al. (2001) and Huang and Sosie (2010b), and our implicit pricing
mechanism. We use the example proposed in Hu et al. (2007) as an the instance
where no linear transshipment prices could be found that induce the agents tochoo
the first best quantities. \\'e also show how our implicit pricingmt'<'hanislllieads to
the coordination of tbis system.
~:'::~::et::e:::~~:;::~h:r::7::~I:s~~~;;~~~=T;;I:,:;) ~~::1:,n~n;:::;i;:2 = (1.2,3)) = I
(6,5,4). Therefore, XNC = (2,1). ow assume that the two agents can tran hip.
Tbe best policy in the centralized supply chain isXc=(1,3) whicb gives riseto lhe
totalprofitofI6.4.
!Jemandl)i3tributioo
SeliinSPrice
Loot Sale Pen&:hy
1I-ansJ>O<lat;onCooll
Sah'llgcVAlue
UuitCa.lofProduet;on
Agent 1
(1.2.3)"ithprobo,bilit;"'(0.3.0.32,O.3Il}
r,_U
h,_O
1'2-,1
"",
<"oS
Determillisti<' (I)
'"2-11
h2 0 0
121- 1
""'..,
Tllble3,4; The Iluelill. (2007) Counter-example
x, X, X, X,, , , ,
, 13.7-,07." 17.811-1.~, 1.5_.07... , -1.4-l.os,,21
, 13.18-0.38.0" 13,18-0.~, 3.1_0.3&1' 0.58_0.38.01'
... ... ... , .
(o) (b)
'1101.01,,3.5: lud,vl<!"l\ll:;xlll'Cle<! I'rQfiuwllh l,in<.'lU1'raru;".hip"'<.'ntPri"""
Now consider lhe corre<ponding decelltralin"ll ",ysll"u with ullnsshil'lllcntll. Table 3.5
show. the eXl>eo:ted profils for the two ~.genu ItS a f""etlo" of the trltnSlihipment price,
s,a"d thcqllllntltiCll, X, Thelin"M trltlsshil'nwl\t l'riN' is hy definilioll rhe S1t1ll.. for
each entry of lhe Tabl", 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) (k'C Jlll el/ll. (2007))
llllctal.{2lXI7}provethatlhcreisnoliu,..... trau""hiplllcmprice, ••"lhat;nd"eel
Ihe agents lo..,.t th.." 'Iualltiti... "" tho Ii",t l><"!il. In fltC!, wh"" 811 ~ [5, 145/19), the
Nash equilibrium is XOC 0 (2,1) with joint profits of IS, and when 811 ~ [115/19, II),
XOC_(2,2) withjoi", 1'rr>liI80fI6.28.
Tablc36sho"..stheilld1\"ldualexpccttd l'rofillcalculatcd BCCOrdmg 10 the dual al-
location m""ha"ism of Anupindi et at. (2001), TIm", this mech/lnism fCl;ullll ill the
N""h I.'<I1IilihriuIll XI)(; _ (2,2) with joint profilSof 16,28, Therefore, thcoonditlOIl
for lhcexistcllct:ofcoord;uatlngdllalallocB[;oll ror two agellts gi\'clI inlluatlgand
Soiii<'(20lOb)isllotSlttisfi,~lTIms,th<"l(elltsKr"um.blelOK1I81IlJj?C(XC)-16,48
l'ilherwilbthelilletlrlrans:;!liplllclllplicesorlhedul'lltlllocatiOllmcchani!;lIl
!\owlIS>illll>cthats" is set llIi by Our illlplicit priCillg mecltllnisl11. Thei,,,plicitpriciug
x,~
1 6 610,56
2 9 9 lU8
J 8.88.88,8
(.)
x,~
1 6 10.2 ~.92
267.28 4
J 6 ~ 4
(b)
Tabl" 3.6, Individual Exr~It~1 Prolil>l ""lh Dual "l1<)("M,,," M,'Ch"lll~1Il
x,~
6 9.1 lU!
99.64 9,1_1
8.8 8.88,8
(.)
x,~
166.1 §.1:l.
266.64 4.62
,
(b)
1Il~'Clmnism isobt"inl~1 form the GNIlS oollditio" in (3.lO), [n Ihisex"mple I'dX). 0
thus I'21(X} is ,~tli",I,,"t tl> 1h" " ...mri'-Ills of 821 in Tllble 3,5(b), Assuming "I 0,5,
the GN13S condition b<.'WIIl~'S
Substituting the r{'l;p<JCti\"{, valu{'l; of S2,(X) ill Table 3.5, otle obtllins theexJ>"Ct~od
individual profits in Tablc3.7(a) and 3.r(b). TI,ell,theNashequilibnutnisXfi_(1.3}
'hal i. nactl)" lh"samc as Ih" first l..st50lutioll. Thctnr"rexpe,·,edl"ofirin lhi.
ca.seisIlIso16.4S,Theref~,ilcallbe"""lllhatlhisi111plicitpricinglllech"ni"nlcads
lO theroorditUltion o£ tile s}'litelll
3.7 Comments
ThecolllrllCt pl"OJIOliC'I in this chIII'1eris limited to the lwo-agent.upply chain. A
IKtiliblceXlellsion 10 Ihe suppl)" chain wilh n>2agcnlllnoedatodetllwith twollew
key features: (l)thesensiLivityofoplimaltran hipment patterns toactllal demands,
and (2) the possibility of coalitions formed bysubsetsonnagents. The coordination
of transshipment problem with these two new features remains a challenging open
problem. We leave these question for the flltllre research.
RecenLly, HuangandSoSic (201Ob) developed several beurisLics for selling the trans-
shipment prices in a general n-agent supply chain. Those heuristics are developed
so that tbeextra profits from tran bipmentsmimictbeallocaliolls in the core of
the ex post cooperalive tran hipmentgame. A centralized depot handles the trans-
shipments in their contract. In the next chapter, we address this problem in detail
andinlroduceamechanismforcoordinatingthetranssbipmentprobleminageneral
n-agentsupply chain.
Thejo/lowing chapter is an edited version o!,
B.llczarkhaniandW.J<ubiak. Tran hipmentpricesandpair-wisestabilityincoor-
dinating the decentralized transshipment problem. In BQGT '10: Proceedings oj the
Behavioml and Quantitative Game Theory, pages 1-6, 2010a
Chapter 4
Coordinating the Multi-agent
Transshipment Problem
Summary: The decentmlized tmnsshipment problem is a two-stage
decisionmakingproblemwheretheagentsfirstchoosetheir'individualpro-
duction levels in anticipation ojmndom demands and ajterdemandreal-
izations they pool residuals via tmnsshipment. The coor'dination will be
nchieved ijat optimality nll the decision varinbles, production/order
quantitiesandtmnsshipmentpattems, in the decentmlizedsupply chain
ar-e the same as those ojcentmlizedsupply chain. This chnpterstudies
the coordinntionvia transshipment prices. We propose a procedur'ejor de-
riving the tmnsshipmentprices based on the coordinating nllocation rule
introduced by Anupindi et al. (2001). With the tmnsshipmentpricesbeing
set, the agents arejree to match their-residuals based on theirindividunl
prejerences. Wedmwupontheconceptojpair-wisestnbilitytocaptu,,~the
dynnmics oj corresponding matching process. As the main result ojth'is
chnpter-, we show that with the derived tmnsshipment prices, the optimum
I tmnsshipmentpattemsarea/wayspair-wiestab/e,i.e./her-earenopairs
of agents that can be jointly better· off by uni/atemlly deviating from the
optimumtmnsshipmentpatterns.
4.1 Introduction
The multi-agent transshipment problem is coordinated if (a) every agent sets its pro-
duction/orderquantityequal to the centrally optimum amount for that agent, and
(b) the transshipment pattern, i.e. the union of individual transshipments among
the agents, in the decentralized problem is the same as the optimum tran hipment
patterns.
Under some conditions on the demand distribution functions, Anupindietal. (2001)
prop se a coore!inating contract that operates upon an allocation rulethatspecifie
each agent's share of the extra profit generated through the transshipments. They
arguethatifanallocation rule in the core of the ex post transshipment game coule!
be foune!, the optimum transshipment patterns woule! be also optimal for all the
agents involved. Granotand Sosic (2003) show that tbiscontract may not support
the voluntary engagement of all the surplus products ane! unsatisfiee!e!emandsinthe
transshipment stage. In other wore!s, some agents might be better off by announcing
only a portion of their surplus proe!uctsor unsati fiede!emandsatthetimeoftran-
shipments. However, in a repeated setting, the agents are willing to share aU of their
resie!uals in anequilibriurn wheneverthee!iscount factor is large enough (J-luangane!
Sosic, 2010a). An alternative allocation rule has been proposed in (Sosic, 2006). The
rule redistributes the extra profit generated through thetransshipmentsaccore!ingto
the Shapley value. Although the resultant allocation is not necessarily ill the core, it
could result in the farsighted stability of the grane! coalition.
The contracts based on the allocation mechanisms require tbat tbeagents be able to
take advantage of side payments (which may not be possible in all si tuations). From
the implementation point of view, th e contracts also need a governing party to
collect the realized profits and redistribute them among the members of the coalition
In order to avoid these difficulties. tbe agents can turn to the contract with pricing
mechanisms. Then, whenever a tran hipment between an agent with surplu and
anotber agent with unsatisfied demand happens, the latter pays the fonner a sun,
proportional to tbe amount transshipped. The advantage of the pricing mechanism is
thatt,headditionalinstitutionforredistributionofextraprofits is unnecessary-agents
who are involved in a transshipment tran action can handle the "redistribution"
without incentive-aligning side payments. Moreover, in this way, the amount of extra
profits that is generated through transshipments between any two agents is divided
completely between them.
Despite the appealing propertie of pricing mechanisms, finding coordinating con-
tracts based on them is challenging. Huetal. (2007) show that linear transshipment
prices,i.e.thetransshipmentpriceswhi harefixedbeforethedecisionsonprocluction
quanlitiesaremade, may not be coordinating even with only two agentsparticipating.
In the general case with more than two agents, Huang and Sosic (201Ob) show that
the transshipment prices whicb are fixed before the decisions on production quan-
tities cannot coordinate thesy tem. They also propose some heuristic approacbes
for finding the transshipment prices which result in betterperformanceinthedecen-
tralized system. In Chapter 3, a contract based on an implicit pricing mecbanism
that could coordinate the transshipment problem with two agents bas been proposed.
With an implicit pricing mechani m, agents initially agree on a formula for setting
tbetransshipment prices as a function of their decisions on productionquantitie,and
once those decisions have b en made and prior to the realization of demands, they
fix the transshipment prices. As they prove, this postponement in fixing the trans-
shipment prices give rise to the coordination of the system. In this chapter, we take
the coordinating allocation rule introduced in Anupindi et al. (2001) and introduce
an equivalent pricing mechanism hasedon this rule. With the transshipment prices
being set, the agents are free to match their surplus products and unsatisfied demands
based on their individual preferences. This resembles a matching game in a two- ided
market where the supply and demand values are real numbers (see Baiou and Balin ki
(2002)). We show that with the derived pricing mechanism the optimal tran hipment
pattern are always pair-wise stable solutions to the corresponding matchingproces,
i.e. given the transshipment prices, no pairs of agents can simultaneously improve
their profits by mutually deviating from the optimal transshipment patterns.
The rest of this chapter is organized a follows. Section 4.2 provides a detailed de-
scription of the problem. InSection4.3theoptimalsolutioninthecentralizedsystem
is addressed. Section 4.4 addresses the decentralized system with the allocation rule
mechanism. Section 4.5 pl'esentsthe transshipment pl'icesderived from thecool'di-
natingallocation rule of Anupindi et al. (2001). Section 4.6 discu es the matching
proces that results in the formation of transshipment patterns and introduce the
concept of pair-wise stability. It also demon tratesthepair-wisestahilityoftheopti-
mum transshipment patterns with the transshipment prices developed in the preceding
sections. An example has been given in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.
concludingl'emarks
4.2 Problem Statement
There are n newsvendor agents producing a homogeneous product in anticipation of
random demands. We index the agents with i E N = {I, .. ,n}. The parameters r"
c,,''''d'', re>1>ecth-ely rep'etientthe unit sellingl),ices, p,oouctiOIlCObta, Il.lld SIIh'llge
"Iluesfor theagclllS. \\'e'ludy".illgl,pcriodproduction-tra.'lSShipmcnllllodd. We
1lSS",,,ethntthereislloco"'Jlctiliono~,settinglheS('lIingp,icesd,,ringlhecoUnle
of onr ",u,ly.is. We rep",""llt Ihe ,,,,,,tor of ,andom demand. by D _ {V,I; t ,v}. The
join, PDF of <1cm"nd is wnliinlOtlS ".<1 twke ,lilferenlial>le. Bdore the realization
oflllarkctdcmll.nds, theagenta dcci<!e On thei,produetion quantitit.. <1enotOO by
the w.:lor X _ {X,li t N}, After the realization of IllIIrket demands, elIcll llgcnt
enCOllnleni cithct surplus products, If, _ IIlIUl{X;- V"Oj, or lll,""ll.lied dcmand,
E. _ """,{V, - X"O}, Accordingly, the llgcnts with su,plus products Irall."hip to
Ihe agcnts "..ith unsatisfied demands. Theallloulll of products trall",hil>ped "mong
agents isdellotoo hy W_{"'"li,jEN} where 11'" is the "IIlOllnl thllt i trll.nsships
IOj(;9jthrougholltlhischllptet). WIOCllprodllcts ....etra'lSShipptodfrolll,toj,1l.
lluittra.n.portationrost,l,j,isinCllrre<Jbyagc"t;
4,3 Centralized Mode
lflhCI.rort~nelltiOlledS}'litc'" is "'''''''goo by a.ingledecision lIlaker, thcoptiltlal dcci-
.io".will bcobtaillool>}'analyzingthetwostagcstochasticdocisionmaking prohie'"
FoIloWlllglhebackv.ardinductiolll'rO«'llS, the a)'litem's lotal I'rolit forgi""n ''II111CS
where,!" -"-,,,-1,; is the lllarginal [!TOfil due lO a "nit oflrall""hipl\lClllafrom;
10 j, The optimal trallSl>hiplllelll pall.." ill obtailloo by soh'ing the following li"cltr
E(x D) • "W'r(X D.W)
J~,Il'JSII,.Vi(.,
~.'l''JSE"V)t.\'
lI',!2:0,Vi,jtN (4.2)
Theoptj"'..I-.lutionof(4_2)"'rcl....~to"'dleoptimallnul!l8hilM'''''1l''''1l ....nlUld
delOO1edb,oW'
,1lIueoCrC(X D)ovcr D. ie- F(X)_ ElrC(X,D)].l'or -"'Ii'''''' X, UMI.-.'ODd
IiodID&tMoaIueoCX "'bicb maxilDUlflitIlol!F(X). :"i"ou:that IlIoI!latl<'f II & COOlOve
fUDCIioa ..nh ""'JoeCt to X (_ HuM« and SoW (20IOb)) 'J'hlo,~ oC sVlItem
optimaiprodlJoC\ionql.lllluitielisdrnotedbyX·
4.4 Decentralized Mode
III tlK! d•..,.,mrlllil.~1 11I0de, the llJll~'UI l:'Q,,,,id•...ro to be ""lr·hllerl..tl~l 8"d i"d;-
vidll"Uyu"''lllfIed. T"eolltoot'JeoIoCroIltlbonttKM.. anlOl'&the~e"Ulinlhili11l0de
aff6fM'(',Md by t1M'roI1JoboratlOl1 ml'rlI..lUlm. I~ tJoe omtract follow;,,, 11..,110..•
coopenllL\~/roopenol",e f~1< In "nupmw e\ at (200I), "'l' OOI-ser <'OIItracUi
""th tbea1locatlOlllll«balus... "·befttbeavuu".d,,iduallyaad ~ti,'l'Iy
~ OIl tben productioo quanUl_ and aftft- t .... reaI~ioa of dcouand. rooc-a-
h,,",,y~lbel"""'pa-.lpalt~ n..~rKt~afll],oro. dlSlrihut-
'''I: lhot maximum ..u.,nabW pro6u d".. 10 u ......lnpmmu ......... I u In I""
The &CI.'CPlahilily olallocflliollll to theo.g...nu ......n be/analyzed thruug!> Ihcronccpl
of.:ore. AlII;UIIIC Ih..t alto:r the realization ol demand, the IlgeJIUI can form a:.lilions
and .......ry out the trallSbhipllM'11U "'DOl'l: t'-o in the best ))OIIlIible ....,.~'...lid thell
m ..h"tnbutethertliultilll)l«lfilain.n) ...,.) IAiQ".\'be .. "u!>-aWitionolo.gcnt.a.
For K',"'n.-aJlteIIol X and D,lhe'WlXIllIum.lta",.bleprolitthrougb trall3lihiJ>TTl"lUl
forthea:.litionQis
k"' SIl"V'~Q
~ "' S EJ • Vj ~ Q
1I"J2:0,Vi.J~Q f~31
We call this the a IJNI. roop«ati''l' tl"anllllhlpn....t~ F.. the pand n-!ol....
(Q '" S). the opt"na1 tr&nlillhipmeat p&ttem obtained &OIl the latter is «\ul\1Olcnt
10 tlx:w in (~2), An alkolion "* ",(X. D). V. ~ S is in the rore .... cooperolnll'
1f1l.w/upmen/,-me------- pme .,th doaracIet"$ic fulX'l..... lIi''nI ill (4,3}--tf
~",(X.D: 2: Ro(X,D),YQcS. (41)
~o,(X,m.R,'(X.D) (HI)
l1JCOO..(·'-11t .... ooreill perhllpsthe''''''''1appca.liIlKWlhilit)·OOllOl'\lti''theroopcrati''l'
llII', .... IIM!O<)·:Ki'oer'lIl1l1llocllliol'rulfl.,lherorc.lhe£ormation .... gr..lld..:.litiollis
KUllrantood. BecttugelhetrllJlSSllipnlClltl;i"acoalitioliarecarr"-odoutIOmllll:imi:ec
thcOOllliliOll·.tollllprofit ....,he11C''''tlh.. K.''"droalilionisformro.lhet ...".-shipment
pllttl'nli_k1~t~__ .bo.leofW· lleDOl'.anaJlo.,.';';'~ln.ble~
"';1] nsult lD tM n-dma...... oIll......llpmen. pllllet'Df. FolIoonn& 1M nsull$ of
0.- (197;;), 1M foU_lIle aJlo.,.UOll rulf, II al_rs in 1M con of tM roopnal"~
llUt!:ilihipmclUpme
Q~{X,O) ~.I..: /I, _ j';£" ""f.\ (4-6)
..I>cre for 'f "', A: ,.ud I'; are 110" optiu".l dllal wllltiOlI of (~.3) ..illl Q ~ IV Thill
allocalion rulCllis rderroo lOlLS Ihe dllalallocohan nJe Auupilldiel III (2001).
I" o.-der to find the mdi\"idllIlUY"l>limUlll (1....-..;'01.. on production 'l"llut,t,,-,,,, firs<.
""'clhcilldivldual]lrofitfullctionllfOl"I",,"'V11Iue!lofXII.lid D,thatia
,,~(X.D)~ r,={X" 0,)- ",If, -eoX, ''',(X,D). (4.i')
...·hen n,(X,D)~ tbe ..... ,'. aJlo.,.l..... oIlhe iftOad .... <:'OOpCrlIti,~
pm<" (DOl. .-rily in lhe con). 1.ct J,DC(X) • EI"'~(X 0)] .. tM~
).II"06t to..::""'t, ;IIIMdettnlrali%led mode&ivm X Tbeopuma! polio:)' Mlbe"::""'l$
III the ~-...ll EqUilibnlllll (NE) OIl X in lhe oorrelpondi'~ lloOll-«l()p('lu\"e plllt'. II
Am11)indi et al (2001) constmcl au allocalio" rule "'hic:ll m1ullS In II~ roordulAtlOl'
ofdeo.:isiollSon l)rod"etiouq"alltiliel!. Thro<em II fol10V0'll frolll Iheir Corollary ".1
Ili"trod"CftlanallocatiOllruleinlheroreofthelleCOndstagerool~r/lli''C&IIlIIe'''hiclI
al80000rdiuateliltm,proollC1ionqUllmitiBliutloedK-etliralizedmode
Theorem 4,1, Con.a.krlM/ollDtr!ingall«alO.... n&k
I>W&lo .... ~....~~~X..... __ J,IJC(X~..)2J,DC"(X'!.",
:C,I,lX,.l•• ,\ ~X:',"Io .... _ ................ --......wItlo~,·t.Io...... .-d
n:{X.O)-o!(X O)-n!{X' O)_Q~(X' 0) (UI)
--==<==='"'
a{(X,D):'Y,,,C(X,D)-(r,min{X,,D,}+v,H.-c,X,), (4.9)
andjor alli, 'Y. ~ 0 and L"N'Y,: 1. Then, thi allocation rute is in the core oj ex
post coopemtive tmnsshipment game. Al 0, ij J,DC(X) is simultaneously continuous
in X, thedemanddensitiesbelongtotheclasojPolyaFrequencyF'uncUonsojo71ler
2, and "pc (X, D) is unimodal in X, jor every X_.. then with this allocation rule the
Nash equilibrium on production quantities will be unique and the same as the 0 pUmal
production quantities.
Tberefore, tbe allocation rule oHX, D) i coordinating tbe two stage transshipment
problem.
4.5 Transshipment Prices Based on Coordinating
allocation Rule
Oneoftbe major practical drawbacks of contracts whicbsolely rely onlheallocalion
rules is tbeneed for a gowrning party to collect and redistribute the profitsdlleto
lransshipments. A more convenient and practically appealing mechanism is a pricing
mechanism. \\Oitb a pricing mecbanism (i) the total profit generated by transship-
ments between two agenls is distribuled only between those two, and (ii) the sum
of money paid by the transshipment-receiver to thetransshipmen!'-send risalinear
fllnction of the amount transshippedo In this section we propose a procedure tod rive
apricingmecbanismforthetran hipmentgamebasedonthecoordinalingallocation
rule in Theorem 4.1. The derived pricing mechanism can facililate the implementation
Aftertherealizationofdemand,thesetofnew vendor agents, ,canbedividedinto
l .... _oflrarablpmetllIlelIersS"'{,II,>O}.andl.... _oll~IIImCl'lbu}""'
D '" () £, >O}. T1w roDoooi.. 1emma wu WK.... 111 SMdIez..5onatIO l'lOO61
Lemma 4.1. (~iDn Ii ill SGncAn·Sonomo (t006)) I/z "(z,. .:,,} .I1.
ooliDn '" 1M 0I)I'"f 01 t'X post CIlOJ'ffllI...~· ,...lWhiJ'l'mI'\t fIl-. omt W' i.I OfHimtJ
IOllltiOOl 01 lilt Il'1I""'JIOrlaliOOl~ in UI). IlIA 1M /lIIlmng IJSlt",.w1 ""'~ /I
.fOIuJio.. ..1111 U'J 2 0 .."d I~J ~ 0 lor all,. 5 ....d) t 0
1"'" V" alld Iy arei" tw:l p&U"...__ a1loc:allo".olprofillhlll '" vnrnllPd ~'I'­
s1npr.1etlU beI-.-.n' &lid j (see ~Soriat>o ('lOO6)). The _ ill todi,_I....
JlfolilJ:O'nl"f1llfdl.o).,..rnbu}..",.·sriltrpaorliOlrIJ~ ..wnl""'''liOlhalll.... IOl.alprolil
P'"tdbrt"'ef}' ...lfquabitaaiioclllionlnl.... <.'On':. Wehll'"eIIW'folloo'I'lIl&~'
Corollary 4.1. Ld W' ~ "" oplirMl pri",1JI HllllliOfl 01 (l.'). TIlt lollmng,yslOll
hili a ,00/"1'001 ...~Ih Uol 20 "nd Yo, ~O /or "II. ES andj EIl
a~(X',D)"E""U<j'
a;(X', D) "'E.... \Y. VjtO
U<j.I;""PvIl~. ¥uS.V}<O (4.11)
The Iallft" ilstRl&Jrtfonwd by notme lhal MX'Ordi,. 10 'I"belnta 41. a;(X".D) is
.... a1loalioa in I.... <.'On': of r:r ,...t 0DClptnt1'" l..-hipmmt pnM'
The~r·WIWailocallORlleNl.... UlItdlOdt'\'eIopapOci..~ Ltt .... Ml....
Il'Wl8l>Jupmenl flliott ...hich is paid by } 10 , b a .."il It.....l"I'.....m
t............-rromlto).thetnalJinalprofiltO-el"llt;wouId~thel~pmeDI
..... - .., -I ... TI1I8, "" IlIlhemarplllL1 prOOttOa«mt I ..betltl'all>llllul'P'llC. milt to)
On the other halld. the~ J n-Uli the product.-qwced Ihroucb the t...-hipmelll
to il'H~ll'itomen;, ThWlV'J a r,-I" ",tboe marplllL1 profit totl~agtnt) ...hen rI'Cei'"\ll&
"ullit from I. The trallsformation
u., ."... 11'.; • (I" -", -1,;)I1'.~
". 1;,a.·"II',j.(rJ -I'J)II',j
.."itb "•• 1... S ..... SrJ OOl1lIOClS.he palr·..·1lioe allocatiom aDd the t"""pmeat prices.
\\f,ha,"'thierollowilql~nllua.
lA!mnaa 4.2. LdU... • (.....-".-1,,)11·.; .""';" (r,- ..... )II'.;. A M>lIOlIOll'''IIIt. ...d .....
f.I,ll)u .. /olu,.,:/",-uS ..... J.n.udllJullll',;>O.•;,.A; ...,.lv·rJ-,..;
Proof- Fil'ljt, OOIe thaI for aU .. S, <>~(X' ,D). A; /I, and For all) t n. o;(X·.D).
";E,,Strond,fromtheoomplelllemary.1ACkIK:lillwehll,-e
II"""",,
A;1I,.A;fi'II-';
Aho, by ddinitlOOlI of t'" and l;". lOr,. S.nd J l B• .-.e ba.~
U" .1'" Pvlt'~
Therefoll'.(·lll) isequi'1\lentto
~~II'~ax;.('OJ-",-I.,)lI',;,¥,tS
J.;~lI'~a~(", 'OJ)I\'~.'tJlB (41Z)
Thisiu tum ,mp!ia
];. ,,11,;_ ];.<-\; .".• IOJ)U;;.'tUS
~s'JII·,~a~("J-,.;)II',;.'tJ.B (113)
Theref~.fOl"lS.DdJ(nsochthllLlI·~>O.the!lOlutiolloflll<'laltersr"lem
ofequtltiOllllillS;.a)":-",.I,,OI',equi'lllcullys;. ...,-jJ; n",rollll'lcu",,,wy
~l.Il.ck"'ltillro"ditloa"'ofthed".lg"arRlJtl'(l\hRt{"'i.sR"dj(nlilld,thlllll',;>O.
,,;.,hR'~),,; .,.; .",-",-I'J and Illereroreboth ....)'8 fordefilll"g.:} ..i11 m;"lt in the
a
:'>OIe lhat for, (S .lId JtD such that II~.O ....). ,'• .hoeol '., iii polrt ollhe optunal
lIOI"uoa of (4 13). 'ext. '"' ......~ the t....-hipalftll palterM that will ..-.11 from
tOO;et....-hiP"""'lpricel.
4.6 Formation of Transshipment Patterns
Cooperative game theory requires that the individual players in the coalition grant
their decision making rights to the coalition. An alternative approach to analyze
the n-player transshipment game is to consider that the sellers and buyers are free
to search the market and match their surplus products and lmmet demands based
on their individual preferences that stem from the given transshipmentprices. Then
the question is "what would be the outcome of this matching process in terms of
transshipment pattern 7"
This problem is an in tance of network formation in the two-sided markets where
buyers and sellers match their trade quantities. 1n this supply chain, any transship-
mentrequiresthemutualdecisionofabuyerandasellerwithrepectto the amount
transshipped. The fact that mutual consent isne dedtoformasingletransshipment
isgenerallyahurdlefortryingtouseanyoff-the-helfnon-cooperative game theoretic
approach Jackson (2005). There are several approaches to model these game situa-
tions.lnthesupplychainwhereeachsellerhasaunitofproductandeachbuycr
needs a unit of product, Jackson (2005) summarizes the approaches taken in the Iit-
erature. 1n spite of the multiplicity of approaches, the concept of pair-wise stability
is perhaps the most tractable.
1n the context of tran hipmentproblem where the buyers and sellers can tran hip
any amounts between themselves, Baiou and Balinski (2002) develop the concept of
pair-wise stability. 1nshort, this approach proposes that the outcome of matching su r-
plus products and unsatisfied demands betwcen buyers and sellers should necessarily
bepair-wisestablewithregardstotheindividualprcfcrences;
a solution is stableifno pair of opposite agents can increase the munber
of units they exchange, perhaps by giving up trades with less preferred
avnts (Baiou aDd Bahnski. 2002)1'
Altbou&b lhardmn'lioaol5lablhtyilt-j ... d... ardinaI~ol...u._
~ an -.l_Il\-ec:an1J.n.al aj,lpCOKh 10 I'f'fIt,:t lbe prd"~f'I>Cf"ord,mnp'-" lbe
HaIlSlllllpttX'lllpr1Cl'S.
Let us assume that lbeIlgCflt.sa~ 1)rO\'k\ed ...ith • set ollra'lSIihilUl.....'t pricw.. s
{s,,!i l S,j t OJ. We define the I'r~f.....~tw:t!ll of each IlgE'Ilt 0Vf1" the ~~llla Ot' the
01'Po!lile~idcof thclransshiplIlcnt ",ark~tMrollO'Joll
• For I l S, tralllll;hipping 10 J' iii Iltcl.....rod ....'ef j (j' ", j) if u.... " u'J ~ O. If
"''' • "" ~ O. tllC't, , III ,nd,ff\"'l'f'll~ ~.'lll'fI t~ipp'lt& to J or J' n.e ~
• For) l 0 tK'ei'inc trall!bltipllllMlu (rom,' ill pre(en-ed O.lft , (,' ", 'J i( "'I'''
"OJ ~ O. If "-.r • 1"J ~ O. tben j '" ind,lfftmt bet~ ''''"''''& ltatlll8lupmmt.s
fron, lor". The Rl '-", • (I'l St' ~J I) ('Omai"" tbe.¥ilenl thal are.t 1Nsl ..
prcl......ble .. ,tOJ
1I"'~_I'rf'lll'nlth~d..finil;OflOfl'.;,_..i5t'&tab;IiI)'"
Definition l. A 11tl~,hiprnenl po>lIe", W (IVIjI' t S,) lU} ;., pa'....".,e Itablt iJ
Jar~,andJ.,;I1t .... ~04ndl",~O
II OJ <mm{lI"E,JimpIIQ LII'... ·JI,ar :[II'OJ-EJ (~141J"'" ....,
..Ak """""''''''' __ f'lllO'lI_u.._·........r·.... _· _-_· _
....r· __ bd_do""-.n-ul_-.-.~ ooabiIoo-.-.~
......,. ..-I .."......,.l~_ul :Jlml. .........ulu.. ......
\\~koo......l).....-..t'_ .......... ....w.-\• ......,~
Thi definition states that witb a stable tran hipment pattern, if the amount of
transshipments between i and j is less than the maximwn amount tbat they can
tran hip between themselves, i.e. min{H"E)}, then it must be the case tbat eitheri
hastransshippeditssurplusproductstotheagentswhichitconiderstobeatleast
aspreferableasj,orj has received transshipments from theagentswhichitconsiders
to beat least as preferable as i. If for some i and j tbe latter does not hold ,tbeyean
lOgetber unilaterally improve their illclivicluaJ Illarginal profits. pecially,thevalueof
1V,)maybeincreasedbye>O,andllf,),forsomej'<,jand IV,,)forsomei'<)imay
both be decreased (if necessary) bye Baiou and Balinski (2002).
Remark 1. ForpairiES andj EB such that eitheru,) <0 or v,) <0, IV,) =0
i the only pair-wise stable tmnsshipment pattern. One side can always improve by
'-efmining from participating in the tmnsshipment.
At this point, one may ask whether there are transshipment prices with which the
optimalsolution,W', isapair-wisestable transshipment pattern for the decentralized
system. The answer to thi qucstionisaffirmative.
Theorem 4.2. ForiE andjEB, if IV,; >0, dtfines;) =A;+//,+t,) =r)-I'j
and if IV,; =0, defines;) =0. Then, the optimal solution, "V', is a pair-wise table
tmnsshipment pattern for the corresponding decentmtized tmnsshipment sy tem.
P1'00f. It is straightforward to cbeck that with these transshipment prices, fori ES
ancljEBsuch that Wi;>O,u;)=A;,anclv,j=ftj.
Al 0, foriESandjEBsuch that IV,; =O,u;) =-//,-t'j, and v,j =1').
N xt, we analyze the preference orderings that result from ;r POI' any given sell I'
iE S, for all j E B such thatllf,; >0 we haveu;) = A; "-0, and for all j E B such
that IV,; =0 webaveu;) <0. Therefore, i has no preference for thebuyerj suchthat
With re;~ to bl,),,", fQl" An)' ,h~ bl","" J ' B, fQl" all , , S ~ud, that 1I.~ > 0
""e ha\~ ",~ .,..; 4: O. FQI" all. slid, thA~ II'~ • O ..-e ha'"e t'~ .. ~I > ,,;_ Therefure, if
II'~ >0, then I
'
, S811d if IV,; O,llIe"
;'J • (illl'~. 0)
ID<lfderlQpnl'I~l~poair ....;",o,IilabiIJlyolW" ..ilhpropo8f'dlrAno!llhipm"fIIpric'e6.
fin.t<:'Ons.d""ll~bu),""«lk1-p""'lI<iUCh thalll·~.O ]Il thosC*ljf'. ,,"~,,:,<O,
11',;.0 l1iiWNe{_ Remad:4 I).
FQI" I~ bu)'eI"-'.... pain! "'ilh II",; >O...~ pnxlel!d ~'cout........ioD. Su~ 1I~ >0
is~palr· ..lieSl.lM_l1len
U".;<IIlIll{lf•. E,}
""d buth ["'J" 11',; < fI, lind [",'J ll'~ < E, _Till"', I lind j eftn ~illlllltlllloo ...ly imprm"
by tl"llJ"",hippinSII"ooditiollllJ lI",o""tof
li..•• lIliO(JI,- L 1I'~,l:.,i-LlI'.;)
'''.;'' ....
bet..-eeo themselvs. :"ote tMt , and J can trallSO>lup Il v ..~thoot a1ten,. tbftr
transoshipmmt IlmOUDlS ";Ib otbft "11S Tb.. additiODal ttllMslnpmmtl~
,boo ,~.....'..... louJ profit b« ...,11".,- The latter roatradicu tblo (lptlluahtv olll;;
'l1>erefc:n. W" mllSl ~ palr-..--_IM
80
c 2
f" II, E,j-I )-3 j ~ {
,., 0 , , O••i>
".·2 I 0
" "
0
,.3 0' II 0 12 0
,., , 07 .. 0 ,
Table 4 I. All ED.mpll!ofTtaRlllllupmmt AlDOl\( rOOt Agrnlll
4.7 An Example
WCiUU.ll'lltcoural>llrollChtodcri'oelloCII'll,,,,,,,hipnOCllll'ti<n!in IhCllO.'O.'<mdsUlgc
lhrou,ghlUI cxample. COllliidet IhelUppl)" cllllin ,,';Ih fourlllcnl.ll SilK"l'''-efOClIllOO
lhellO.'O.'<>Ddllt., ..oe.'.w.mcthatthedec:Wonaooprodoct.ionqUlmt'llCllha,... t>een
allUdymadeandlhedemandliha,... al8obeenreahud A<:oordntd",tbct'ean!tM>
setm and tWO buvers ill the 1)1IlmI 'f1Mo panmeln5 an! p,,,,,, in Table t 1 1'be
optimal tl"llM>hipmft>1 pauem m the ~ntrallZll'dmode is
w· ~ (IIi} _ I.lIil ~911'Q ~5}
The dwtJ opIunal lIOlution ~ ),i .. I, ),;,1.3 and ,..; ~ O,/'i I The dual allocation
for Ihisproblcltt 18 A .. {40,O,9,21.5}. Following IheT~n 42, "'llllCl 'IJ~5,,"·
6".,,, 5, Rnd'43" 0 Wilh th""" trnnSllh,pmcnt pri.,.,;, Ihe mnrgl""ll'roRttI dnc 10
II'llI"",hiIMnc"tlI~.llO'l\'llinrigure41 Thl'prefcreOCl'ordcri'llfotlhcf\gcnl5tltl'
Ih""..,follo-"'lllClllllllmd>ff~'lhel""""'U'1ll"61,,ppill&to2.... 3.&«cllt4·.ool}·
~ernd partner iii &«""t 2 ($i,,~ ..oJ < 0)• ..,1 2;" iDdiffft'mt brt.....,., ..'ce,,~~
l~pll...m.froml .... 4,lUldfinall)·.tIV"t3prften4lJ'o'Cl'l Todll'dlhl'Mabihl}
ofopt"naI.so!ut_.nththe.""".........llObPdt...........prDftllprio:'ftl .......... lJooIo-'
lM"umbn'sOlll'tdtbnkshowthewulpr06tlOthe~"C"'1 0De0lZl
"
._.=3... }.:••!._.. _!.~
'!,':":!····~~~9 fr..~··-~
..:..-.-
0:~I/," ....•:..:.':.';"
Fig,,~ll: OptimalBlld I'Bir.\\"ilIt! SUib'" Tran!l6hipment Plltterns
W·-{lIi1· 1•lr,i-9·lIiJ-a}.
DO p&IB of~ and bu)'ft'S can impro'l~ tbn. profiu. b,' unilalrnl dn1.auoo rr....
the optimal 1....lSlllpmenl pllHern.
4.8 Comments
O"eoflhemal"_urnpiionsi"thill",oeteliAtl"1l1he~1Illdo"OII"cura,,yCOllt
whc,,~idi',&locoopcratcwith~hotl...... 110000",,,r,i,, rmJity, IhcrcB,c...,,"rll!
lypc8of<'OO!lllthllthllvtltobcincur",,1 I"onlcr to t..blish and IIlllin",l..tIoIlShil'll
bcI.....,.,1l ill<:kpe"dellt ,,&..m... In the'_tm..lltcr cxplicitly l"du<J.ethecoopcra·
lioIlCO>lJliIllQtbcanal)'Sisofdccell1ra!Uledlrall!lldup,"..lltprobl.1n
"
Thefollowingchapteri an editedve"sion of:
B. lIezarkhani and W. Kubiak. Symmetric new vendor tran hipmellt games with
coopcraLioncosts. To be ubmitted
Chapter 5
Symmetric Newsvendor
Transshipment Games with
Cooperation Costs
Summary: In a tmnsshipment game, supply chain agents coopemte
to tmnsship surplus products after demand realization. The pmblem has
been well studied in lhe litemture, however, geneml analytical results for
it seem out of reach at the moment. In this chapter, we tudy the coop-
emtive tmnsshipment game with ymmetric newsvend01' having normally
distributed independent demands. We pmvide chamclerization of optimal
indiuidualquantities, the maxilllum e.rpecledpmjit , alldi7"lillid'Ul,lallo-
cations for these games. In particular, we prove that though individual
allocations grow with the coalition size they diminish at the same timeac-
cording to two laws of diminishing individual allocations. These results
though interesting by themselves are only a point of departure for study-
ing the games with coopemtion costs. The coopemtion costs depend on
the cooperation netw07'k structure. The chapter considers two, the clique
and the hub, and provide the necessary and sufficient condition f07' the
cost per link necessary to render the core of the game non-empty for ei-
ther. These maximum admissible costs are alway decreasing for cliques,
however. increasing or exhibiting a unimodal pattern for hub .
5.1 Introduction
A lransshipment game is conccrned with a group of newsvendors who sell a similar
product in separate markels and who are willing to reduce their uncertain d mand
risks by participating in agreemenls that allow them toshareunsoldproduclsamong
themselves. In responsivetmnsshipment, which is the focus o[lhis chapter, ncwsven-
dol's have the option to transship surplus products, if any, aftej·thcrcalizaliono[
markct demands to other newsvcndors. The individual newsvendors lhus nced to de-
ide their optimal production!orderquantities, and tben todecicle how to lransship
surplus products after the realization of market demands. In a decentralized supply
chain, these decisions are functions of a cooperation mechanism that ncwsvenclor
agr"'" upon. The efficieney of ueh a mechanism is determined by eomparing the
quantity decisions tbat tbe mechanism leads to witb the quantity decisions that are
optimal for tbe centralized system. A mechani m tbal makes the decentralized y tern
quanlity decisions the sarne as those of the cenlralized s)'stem is called a coominat-
ing mechanism. A mechanism i essentially a contract in a supply chain viewed as
nexus-of-contracts. As it is discussed in Chapter 2, the growing literature on up-
ply chain contracts seeks to design coordinating contracts (see also Ilezarkhani and
Kubiak (201Oc), Liand Wang (2007),01' Gomez-Padilla et al. (2005)).
A common assumption made in previous studies of the tran hipment game is that
cooperation among newsvendors is costless. However, in reality, when newsvendors
cooperate with each other, they in ur cost associated with negotiations and gov-
ernance, e.g. common infrastructure and monitoring. The aim of this chapter is to
include cooperation costs into the analysis of cooperative transshipmentgame.
"[C)ollectivedeciionmakingprocesse.areoftenrelativelycostly"(\\"iUia=n,1975,
p. 45). The crucial importance of cooperation costs in economic analy is has been
known for a long time. The pioneering paper of Coase (Coase, 1937) on transac-
tion costs and the works of Williamson (e.g. Williamson (1975))-that have given
rietothetransactioncosttheory-attesttothisclaim. The costs that are incurrPd
whenever economic agents cooperate with each other will detcrmine thc nature of
their mutual operations. Adrian and Press (1968) introduce eight cost groups lhat
arc inherent in colJeclivedecision making: (1) information costs, (2) respon'ibility
costs, (3) inter-game costs, (4) costs of division ofpayofl's, (5) dissonancccosts (6)
inertia costs, (7) time costs, and (8) pcrsuasion costs. To the best of our knowlcdge,
lhe costs of cooperation among agents have been assumed away from all the supply
cllain contracting models, including lransshipment models, in the lileralurethus[ar.
Nevertheless,anumberofstudiespointtoth importance of this issue. Inanempiri-
cal tudy, Grover and ~Ialhotra (2003) examine the drivers and effects of transaction
costs on supply chains and emphasize underutilization of the transaction costtheory
in supply chain literature. VoBand chneidereit(2002)provideaclassificationscheme
for upplychaincontracl and consider their interdependencies with transaction cost
economics. In another empirical study, Artz and Brush (2000) examine the factors
affecting cooperation costs. They how that asset specificity and environmental un-
certainty directly increase cooperation costs, and also that by altering the behavioral
orientation of the coalition, the relational normslowerexchangecosts.
The transshipment game without cooperation cost has been well studied in the liter-
ature (Paterson et aJ. (2011) provide a review of the literature). Rather than using
non-cooperative game theory and drawing upon pricing mechanisms as the primary
oordinating mechanism-which is traditionally applied in two-agent supply chain,
e.g. Rudi et al. (2001), Hu et al. (2007), Huang and Sosic (201Ob), Hezarkhani and
Kubiak (2010b) (Chapter 3), and Hanany et aJ. (201O)-we employ cooperative game
theoryanditsallocationrulelllechanismsinthi·chapter. The main advantage in 0
doillg is that cooperative game tbeorysitnplifies lhe allalysis of cooperationamong
the agents by taking a holistic approach. Chapter 4 shows an example of implcmen-
tations of price mechanisms in multi-agent transshipment game (see also I-1ezarkhani
and Kubiak (2010a)). An allocation rule specifies each agents' share of total profit
generated by agents' coalition. Then, if all agents are satisfied with their allocations,
the coalition isslable. Thus, it is beneficial to all agents to maximize the coalition's
total profit. Although there are various interpretations of the stability concept in
game theory (see Jackson (2005) for a review of literature), we use the concept of core
as the measure of stability in transshipment coalitions (Owen, 1995). Nagarajan and
Sosic (2008) provide a survey of applications of various game theoretic conceptsin
The literature on the transshipment game contains two different game setups. Anupindi
etal. (2001) study a two-stage non-cooperative/cooperative setup where they give an
allo ationruletodistributetheprofitsrealized by transshipments after the demand
realization among newsvendors. However, with this rule the newsvendors have incen-
live tobothdeviatefromthecentrallyoptimaltransshiplllentpatterns (Sosic, 2006),
and break apart from the coalition after the realization ofdelllands(Suakkaphongand
Oror, 2010). Another approach to tbe transshipment problem allows the characteris-
tic function tobee.xpected payoffs. For a general overview of stochastic cooperative
gamesseeSuijsetal. (1999). Slikkeretal. (2005) prove the core non-emptiness for
the transshipment games with the characteristic function being expectedpayoffs,and
Chen and Zhang (2009) generalize this result to games with concave ordering cost.
The translation of expected allocations in the core into realized allocations does not
necessarily guarantee stability, however, the distribution of realized allocations can
be done in a way tbat they remain in sync with the expected allocations. For ex-
ample, Charnes and Granot (1977) introduce a mecbanism that minimizes th total
objectiollsofagellts to therliffcrellce betweell theirexpecte<.land realizc<lallocations.
In order to model the impact of cooperation co ts in transshipment game, \Vedraw
upon the inter-organizational governance literature \Vhich argues that the network of
external contracts is the most important facet of an organization 'senvironment(c.f.
Smith-Doerr and Pow II (2005)), which determines the costs that an organization
incurs to cooperate with its environment. The economic actions are embedded in
networks of relationships among agents. These networks affect the economic perfor-
111alice through illter-finn resourcepoolillg, cooperation, allrlcoordillatedadaptatioll
(Vzzi,1996). Gulati (1998) suggests considering the implications of network struc-
ture. Zaheerand Venkatraman (1995) argue that the cost of coordinating exchange
isa fllnction of both tbenetworkstructureand the process. As the network structure
is a determinant of the cooperation costs in coalitions, we con idel' it as a variable in
our model. Rosenkopfand Schilling (2007) stndy the network structures in different
coalitions across various industries. The network structures differ with respect to the
level of connectedness of their members and the number of connecti ns among them.
Van den Nouweland (2005) studies the strategic formation of cooperative networks
with positive costs for establishing links among agents. We base our analysis in this
chapter on the assumption that cooperation cots in transshipment games is deter-
mined by the structure ofa network connecting participating n wsvendors. Then
it follows that the total cooperation cost among a coalition of agents is a function
of total number of links in the network of the coalition. Accordingly, we consider
two rlifferent typical structures for networks in transshipment games: (1) Clique net-
work structure where a link needs to be established between any pair of agents in
the coalition, and (2) Hub network structure where the connections among agents
are established through a central coordinator agent, i.e.,each agent is linked to the
central coordinating agent.
We demonstrate that transshipment games with symmetric newsvendor agents facing
independent and normally distributed demands fall into threecategories: over-mean,
under-mean, and mean games. The category depends on the critical fractile ofa
single new vendor. We show that individual quantity in over-mean games of any
size is over-mean, optimal individual quantity in under-mean games of any size is
under-mean, and individual optimal quantity in mean games of any size is mean.
As the game size grows these individual optimal quantities get closer to the demand
distribution mean for the over-and under-mean games. However, for either category
we show a threshold value t· of the transportation cost t such that the individual
optimal quantity actually converges to the distribution mean if the transportation
cost does not exceed the threshold, and to a value determined by at-dependent
critical fractileotherwise. Irrespective of the category, the individual allocations grow
asmorenewsvendorsjoininthegrandcoalition,thatisasthesizeofthegamegrows.
However. we prove two laws of diminishing individual allocations that accompany this
growth. We claim that the absolute individual gain resultingfrol11 thegrandcoalition
beingjoineel in by one more newsvenelor strictly decreases. This law is key for the
analysis of games with clique networks, and it e10es notelepenel on transportationcost,
t. The other claim is that the absolute gains make up a convex sequence (Hazewinkel,
2002) up to a certain thresholelgranel coalition size n' anel a concave sequence from
that threshold on. Thethresholel e1epenelson the transportation cost tso that higher
transportation costs result in a smaller threshold. This law is key for the games with
hub networks. The threshold may not exist in which case the sequence remainsconvex
for any grand coaiition size. We show that this is the case for small transportation
cost, that is I less than I'
Unlike the transshipment game without cooperation costs, transshipment games with
cooperation costs may have empty cores. This depends both on the network struclure
and the cooperation cost per link, J<, ill thelletwork. Wedevelopasufficielltalld
necessary condition for non-emptiness of the core of games with cooperation co ts,
andgiveasuffirientandneressarycondition for the cost per link toguaranteeanon-
empty core in these games. These conditions can be translated into the maximum
admissible cost per link that guarantees a non-empty core. This cost depends 011 the
network structure. It decreases for the clique so that for any given cost per link [{
one can determine the largest game with non-empty core, all larger games would not
be stable as their cores would be empty. The cost is either increasing or unimodal for
the hub. In the latter case it actually increases up to the critical grandcoalitionof
sizen" and then decreases from that size on. Consequently, with the hub network,
newsvendors may look for a critical mass in terms of their number first in order to
be able to guarantee non-empty core for their game for a given cost per link. This
may, however, only happen prior to n", which always happens ifn"" = 00. Moreover,
we show that n" ~ n'. Thus, if a finite n' does not exist, then neither does a finite
n". Finally, we show that for costless transportation n" does not exist, that isn"
happens at infinity. Thus, the maximum admissible cost increases asymptotically to
games. In both these cases, the grant coalition size mllst be large enough to be abIe
to afford a given cooperation cost per link below the limit. However, if the cost per
link is at the limit or above it any game's core is empty. We illustrate these results
wiLh some computaLional experiments.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 brieRy introduces the
general transshipmenL game, and Section 5.2.1 tailors it to symmeLric newsvendors.
Section 5.3 demonstraLes Lhe general properUes of optimal quantiUes in symmeL-
ric newsvendor transshipment games with independent and normally distribuLed de-
mand . Section 5.4 studies the general propertie of maximum expccted profits in sym-
metric newsvendor transshipment games wiLh independent and normally distributed
demands. lL determines the characterisUc funcUons of these games as well as in-
dividual allocations in Lhe cores of the games. IL then proceed to how thaL the
individual allocation, though growing with the izeofcoaliLions, are subject to LWO
laws Lhat diminish Lhe growLh. These two laws are key to the transshipment games
wiLh cooperation costs studied in Section 5.5. Thesectiondetermincsthecharacter-
iSLic functions of symmetric newsvendor transshipment games with cooperation co LS
for the c1iquc ancl thc hub and gives a necessary and sufficicnt condi tionfornon-empty
core in Lhese games. This condition is then studied in Section 5.5.1 with tbe aim LO
determine tbe maximum admissible COSL per link that renders a Don-empty core for
positive transportation co LS. Section 5.5.2 studies the same problem under the as-
sumption ofcostlcss LransportatioD,and Section 5.5.3 does it formeannewsvendors
Finally, Section 5.6 provides some directions for furLherresearch .
5.2 The Transshipment Game
Consider a set N of n newsvendors agents. Th agents need to decide Lheir produc-
Lion/order quantities (simply quantities hereafLer), X;, in anticipaLionofaconLinuous
and twice differentiable random demand D; wiLh mean !J.. and sLandard deviation u"
ieN. For each newsvendor, LbemarkeLsellingprice, purcbasingcost, and salvage
form a t...,./upment coaltliool to lr&nlilolup Ibm otben'W wrplus producu to othef
lIIot'lRbtnoltMcoalttioolaflnIMlN1uatiooloidemluxb..IDOI'tl«tol.........pa-
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Let /3" i E N, be the individual allocation that newsvendor i receives in a grand
coalition, that is the coalition containing all newsvendors in N. Theallocations/3;,
i EN, are said to be in the core of the transshipment game if and only if L.'QI3, ~ jQ
for all Q eN, and L,i,NI3, = IN. That is, a coalitional game has a non-empty core if
allocations can be found such that for any subset of agents, thesum of their allocations
is at least as much as the value of the sub-coalition made of that subset of agents.
The following key theorem by Slikkeretal. (2005) ensures a non-empty core for any
transshipment game.
Theorem 5.1. (Slikker et al., 2005) The tmnsshipment game with the chamcteristic
funclionclefinedin(5.J)hasanon-emptycore.
This thcorem implies that it is always to the benefit ofindividuaI newsvendors, more
prccisely never to their disadvantage, to form infinitely large coalitions as long as
th re is no cooperation costs involved in forming the coalitions.
5.2.1 Transshipment Games with Symmetric Newsvendors
The transshipment game with symmetric newsvendors, being a special case of the
transshipment games, has always non-empty core by Theorem 5.1. By the newsvendor
symmetryanyindividualallocations/3;,iEN, in the core of the cooperative game
played by n newsvendors must equal 1/n-th share of the grand coalition ma.ximum
expected profit jN = I n . Therefore, we need to study this profit to determine the
core of the game. This is done in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. However,we need to derive a
formula for IN(X) = In(X) for symmetric new vendors from (5.1) first. This i done
The symmetry of newsvendors ensures that any unit transshipment between any two
newsvendors results in the same profitp=r-I/-t> 0 for lhecoalition, which al-
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5.3 Opt.imal Quantities wit.h Independent and Nor-
mally Distributed Demands
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Figure 5.1: Functions<l>(Y) and <l>(y'nY)
Hcan be observed from (5.11) that, since the second derivativeofJn ( X) with respect
to X is always negative, the optimal quantity can be found from the first ordel
dJn(X)/dX =n(1· - c) - ntFD(X) - npFz(nX) =O. (5.13)
Let Xn be a solution to (5.13). Also, let¢and <l> be the PDF and CDFofthestandard
normal distribution respectively. Usingthelransformation
for n ~ I, and (5.13), the equation
(5.14)
characterizes the optimal quantity for a transshipment game of ize n (see Appendix
for the detailed derivations). Figure 5.1 depict the relative behavior of functions
<l>(Y) and <l>(y'nY).
A gam of ize one is equi\lllent to a single new vendor for which the optimal quantity
isobviouslyY,=<I>-'(~).Jfthefraction~islcssthanO.5,i.e.r-c<c-v,then
the optimal quantity fora illgle newsvendor is less than the demand meall/1, hence
we refer to this type ofnewsvelldor as an under-mean newsvendor. lfr-c>c-v,
then the optimal quantity for a single newsvendor is larger than demand mean /1,
hence we call this type of newsvendor an over-mean newsvend01·. The case with
r-c=c-vimplies}', =0. Then,theoptimalquantityforasinglenewsvendorequals
the demand mean /1, hence we call thi type of newsvelldor a mean new vendor. We
extend these three categories of newsvendors to the transshipment games by saying
that the transshipment game of size n i under-mean, over-mean, and mean ifYn<O,
Yn > 0, and Yn = 0 respectively. Observe that by (5.14), we have Yn = fnY, for
t = O. Then, the grand coalition of n newsvendors boils down to a single newsy ndor
with demand of Z = nD. Therefore, from this point on we exclude t = 0 from our
analysis in this section. The following lemma shows that the game category for any n
is determined by the category of a single newsvendor game, and remain unchanged
forall izegames.
Lemma 5.2. For n ~ I,
• ffY, >0, then Yn>O.
• ffY, <0, thenYn<O.
Proof. The proof is by contradi tion. Consider the first proposition. uppose that
Y, > 0 and Yn• ~ 0 for some n' ~ 2. Then, either 0 < <I> (vn<Yn·) < <J>(Yn·) < 4 or
<J>( vn<Yn.) = <l>(Yn,) = 4· In the former case, let 4>( vn<Yn·) = p4>(Yn.) where 0 < p < I.
The equation (5.14) theu simplifies to 'I>(Yn·) = t+;,--'".,) ,and thus, t+;,--'•.,} < 4· On
the hand, since r-v-t > 0, then ~ < t+p(~__cl/_t). However, for Y1 > 0 we have ~ > ~,
and thus 4 < ,+p(;:.r~_,) which leads to a contradiction. In the latter case, equation
(5.14)simplifiesto;:=;;=4whichalsoleadstoacontradictionsinceYi >0. Therefore,
ifY, >0 then yn>o for all n~2.
Now, consider the second proposition. Suppose that Yj < °and Yn , ~ °for some
n' ~ 2. Then, either 4 < <I>(Yn,) < <I>(v'n'Yn,) < 2<I>(Yn,) or <I>(v'n'Y",) = (1)(Yn,) = 4
In the former case, let <I>(v'n'Yn,) = K<I>(Yn,) where 1 < K < 2. The equation (5.14)
then simplifies to <I>(Yn,) = '+K(r-_Cv_t) , and thus, '+K(r--.:'v-t) > 4· On the hand, since
r-lI-t > 0, then L+",(r-_Cv_t) <~. However, since Yl < 0, then ~ <~, which leads to a
contradiction. In the latter case, the equation (5.14) simplifies to ;:=;;=4 which also
leads to a contradiction since Y, <0. Therefore, ifY, <0 then Y,,<O for all n,,2
Finally, consider the last proposition. Suppose that Yi =OandYn ,*Oforsomen'''2.
Then, either <I>(v'n'Yn ,) < <I>(Yn ,) < 4 or ~ < 'I>(Yn ,) < <I>(v'n'Yn ,) < 2<I>(Yn ,). Since
r-v-"l > 0, then we have ~ < t+p(~__CIl_t) < 1, in the former case, and ~ < t+,.(r-':~-t) <~
in the latter case. On the other hand, since Y, = 0, then;:=;; = ~ which leads to a
contradiction in both cases. Therefore, ifY, =0 then Y,,=O for all n~2
We now show that the over-mean games reduce their optimal quantities as their size
grows. These optimal quantities get closer to the demand mean p,. Similarly, the
under-mean games increase their optimal quantities as their sizegrows again getting
closer to the demand mean p,. Finally, the mean games keep their optimal production
levels equal" for all game sizes which follows from Lemma 5.2. We have the following
Theorem 5.2. We have the Jollowing
• FOT oveT-mean games, Y, > Y2 > ... > Yn >
• For under-mean games, VI < Y2 < < Yn < ..
Proof. The proof is by oont""lictiou. The syslem o!eqlUltiollsoblained from lhe
l'<l'llltiol' (iI,14) for allY pair" and" -I,,, ~:2 implies that
Fin;t,oollsidero>"Cr-llIeallg"lUCll. Suppose thllt Y., I ~ Y., forlj()",e,,'~:2, Since 4' is
striClly inc.......iug, ""c ha\"C .~(f~'_d ~ 4>(Y~,). By Lemma I, f~ >0 for all ,,~l. lhus
wealsoget~Y.,_,<,fii)'.,.whicbirnplietloJl(Jii'=1Y.·_tl<<I>(Jii')'.,)·lIellce,
14>(Y.'_I)+P<¥(~Y.'_I)<loJl(Y.')+p'Io(,J;i'i'.,)"'hiehleadsloaoolltradiction
Therefore. Y._ 1 >Y. for ...llu~2
Second. consider under-mean games. ~upp<ll;C lhat ).'_1 ~ }'.' lor SOnIC u' ~ t.
We hs\"C <\>{Y.'-d ~ 'I'(Y.,). By Lenulla l. Yn < 0 for all n ~ I, thus ""C also gel
~y~,_, > ,J;i'Y.' "'hieh il!ll'lies'I'(~i'"'_I) >1>(,J;i'Y.,). Ilence.I1>(Y.'_I)·
1~~(Jii'="TY.'_tl > 11>(Y.,) .. P'f>(,J;i'Y.,) which leads to a cotllr...diction 'nlerdo....
Y._ 1 < I'. for all n~2
figure iI.2sh"".. the ",h"",ofY.fortwoillstanceso!transshilHnenlgalllCll. Olwio"sly.
theol'timalquamiliesaredecrcasillgfortheo\'e1"-meangame(Figureil.2(a})alld
inereasing for the llllder_rneangl\fflC(Figure5.Z (h)).
Altllough th~ t1sk pooltug """,hanis", nsturally ,'ml>,,,ld....-l in a """lilion-r~....al,~1
in l.....'nll's iI.:2alld Tlleorelll iI.:2-mak"!l tlte tneall I'''' natural target for tllCoptitnal
prod"etiotiquanlit}·itlaeoa.lition,tlll~optilJlalqllallljtydoe!lllotll~rilYCOl\\..,rge
to the "'eall I' M the COftlitioll ai.", growl!. Thi" is shown in Theorem 5.'l presented
Iaterinthisseetion.l3eforepro\·ingthisthooremotleneo:lstoimUitigatethe"'-"Q"cnce
Theorem 5.3. For gome8 (Jf.n:.o: II u"d n -I. n ~:2 and I ~ I < n. other thing~ bring
equoJ.u'<!hat'<!~<M
•.m \
•.m ;'
(')"=40,c=15,v=IO,L=1O (b)T=40,c=35,v=IO,L=10
Figure 5.2: Values of Yn for 1\vo Instances o[ Transshipment Games
Proof The system of equations obtained by considering the equation (5.14) for any
pair nand n-l, n~2 and 1 sl <n, leads to
<1>(Yn)-<1>(Yn -tl . _ ~ >0
<1>( vn=1Yn - l ) - <1>( v'iiYn ) t
By Theorem 5.2, i[ Y, > 0, then we have <1>(Yn ) - <1>P'n-I) < 0 [or 1 S I < n. Therefore,
the denominator must be negative as well, thus <1>( vn=1Yn - l ) - <1>( v'iiYn ) < O. ince
<1> is strictly increasing, we get i:' < /i!5. IfY, <0, then again by Theorem 2 we
have <1>(Yn )-<1>(Y,,-I) >0 [or 1 sl<n. l'lence, the denominator must be positive as
well, thus <1>( vn=1Yn -l) - <1>( v'iiYn ) > 0 which result in i:' < /i!5.
This leads to the [ollowingcorollary.
Corollary 5.1. We have the following'
• FaT over-mean games, 0 < Y, < V2Y2 < < v'iiYn <
• For unde,··mean games, 0 > Y, > V2Y2 > ... > v'iiYn >
Theorem 5.2 and Corollary 5.1 show a "complementary" behavior of the sequences
Y"and v'iiY,,; whenever one of them is descending the other must be ascending. This
IIl..,;t bellO in order to ",",ti$fy the "'llIllion (5_14). Wellowfocll!lOlllhcqUftltioll
....tlCl'!dolhe6et"'08e(IUCllC'eltendlolL'ltbe9'me8~gr<700~? We b<>gin with (I'M'
followinitecltnic&llenmlll.
ProoJ-lr.aequClItt .... di\~lO<><>l\.nd .. llfq....DOI!b"isbourKitdbelowbyK
thcn ...b,.di,-el'lf!lito<><>.providedK)O{Kosmala.l99B). Sintt"m.._.. .,Jii "",if
Iml,,~_ll'.I.II" 0 then i1 mlllit be the caw that 1",..._I.,!iil'.I- <><>
...e"l'el <r-II<?(r-t:). 2(e-II)<r-".'"
1
.·O.•••-'(T.".').~ '1'·'('-')
a •• '(~)~O.b.<><> i/n2(e-II)
.... /or ......__"I""",.., .... ul!O"j<r-v<2(e- ..).2(r-c)<r-" ..""
1
.. ·O'6 ....-,(~)-"";fl<2(r-c)
••• '(t;s)SU .. -co if0;2(r-c)
Proof. Proof by C'OI'lr&p(I5ith~_ A oO'"f1lPllOilm... proof of A - lJ is _8 - ~_ n ...,
.. A_lJ __B .. ...4. Forthepu,-ptWofOllrprool"lIIlSUnletlllltlJ,,,B,(onlyolle
<:all helnle). 11M'll _8,,, -vi _lJ,_~A
Finlt.oo'."oe,.0\1·f-IIlC'Ulp'I1OI."",....."'ha'..,t<r-II<2(r-e-)and2(c-II)<r-il
(a _0 ",ul b< oc). or (a ~O ""d b. 001
To 1'1'U\'Il thRt if I <2(e-uj,tll<'n a_OIl,Kl b<<><>, it mll"L be.I"",'" thlltifa;l:O
Rnd b. 00, ll~" I 2: 2(<:-,,). If" 2:0 Rtld b. 00 Il~" the equRtioll (5,1~) oc'Wu",",
r-c;t'l>(a)+(r-v-t), or <)l(a); -<+tH . By Lemma 5.2, 1', > 1'2 > ... > Yn ... ~a~O,
and moreover <I>(Yd ; ;:;; and <1>(0) ; 1/2, thu a must satisfy ~ S <I>(a) < ;:;;. Th
right hand side always holdssincet<r-v. In order for the left handsidetohold,we
must have t ~2(c-v). This proves ift<2(c-v) then a;O and b< 00. In t11iscase
theeqUation(5.14)becomes1·-c;t/2+(r-v-t)<I>(b),orb;<I>-'(~)'
To prove that if t ~ 2(c - v), then a ~ 0 and b ; 00, we must show that if a ; 0
andb<oo, tbent<2(c-v). Ifa;Oandb<oo, then the equation (5.14) becom
r - c; t/2 + (r - v - t) <I>(b), or <I>(b) ; ~. By Corollary 5.1, Y, < )2Y2 < ... <
JjiYn ... Sb<oo,and<I>(oo);I,thusbmustsatisfy;:;<<I>(b)<1. The left hand ide
holds since for over-mean games t<r-v. Inorderfortherighthandsidetohold,we
must have t < 2(c-v). This proves that if t ~ 2(c-v) then a~ 0 and b; 00. In this
case the equation (5.14) becomesr-c;t<)l(a)+(r-v-t),ora;<I>-' (-C+;'H).
Now considel' coalitions of under-mean garnes. Then, wehav 1<"-11<2(c-I/) and
2(,·-c)<,·-v. By Lcmma5.3, thcl'e al'c only two possible scenarios fOl'aandbasn
tcnds to infinity: {a;Oandb>-oo},or{aSOandb;-oo}.
To prove that ift<2(r-c), thena;Oandb>-oo. it must be shown thatifasO
and b;-oo, then t~2(r-c). IfaSO and b;-oo, then the equation (5.14) becomes
1'-c;t<I>(a), or <I>(a); T' By Lemma 5.2,1', < 1'2 < ... < Yn ... SaSO, '1>(1',);;:;,
andmoreover<I>(0);1/2,thusamustsatisfy;:;<<I>(a)s~.The left hand side holds
ince t < r -v. In order for the right hand side to hold, we must have I ~ 2(,. -c).
This proves that ift<2(r-c) thena;Oandb>-oo.lnthiscasethcequation (5.14)
becomes"-c;t/2+(r-v-t)<I>(b),orb;<I>-'(~)
To prove tbat ift~2(1'-C), then aSOand b; -00, it must be shown that ifa;O
andb>- ,tbent<2(r-c).lfa;Oandb>- thentheequation(5.14)becolll
r-c;t/2+(r-v-t) <I>(b), or'l>(b);~. By Corollary 5.1, Y, > )21'2 > ... >
Jji1' n .~b>-oo. and <I>(-oo) ;0, thus b must satisfy O<<I>(b) < ;:;. Sincet<,·-v,
Fit;u~[,.3 l"n.....)~uafuoctiOlloif
lhen ro..lM lefl hand side 1.0 bokl we '''ISlI...,~, <2(r-c). Thoen&i'l haDdsidebokll
ro..lheunder-"""",~....... ThisPfO''Slhal,f/<!:2(r-c) thenasOalldb~-"" In
th .. """"lhccq""tio"(6.Ulb<>oo,,... , C~14'{..).~ .. _of>-l(r;,)
Fig"." [,.3 sho."" Ihe limit .. ~ li11l~~ .. l'~ """ funclion of / for "''I.'f·".....11 find under-
rnr""g""'('!I, It follo"",,frolll'n,eor<:1r flA lh"l "ulliciently 10'" trn"'!>Q,tntion <'061,
thllti"lheOOlitllotezcuding2(c 1') [or tl", ",,,,r-m,,all gtllUetI and Hottzcttd,'ng
2{r-c) for the under."K'811gtlH,.,.,alrn.lllheopti",umquantitytoco'WI'fgc 1.Olhe
denllllld '_"I' ... the p_ liu Ir...... TIlt'rrfore. 5ullic;""lly Larg.. p'Mfi be«>t~
pntCtlcalJYIml2llpme.;rorthnoe"ulliaentl)w.COIIlli.
On 1M other ha..d. b the .........·..-n pmaI, lhe ""'"' lhe t~allonC(Il;l n·
Cft'do2(c·,,)......i"&uptowar'd,,;r-oI.lheclolt.o.-rtbeoptimalquanlllobft'oon l.O
); ... '(~) for sufficw:ntly Iarv pmt'lo n-. 1M opuma! quanl,toN 01 __
d"nznlUffirVnll}·IarJ.. p.-boM:lnM'pr..-tonoll]·~fromlbeopl" ...1
quant,!1tli ro..aI'UlfkO'l'lel"·..-n ~'l'Ildor~. ~. ot,," '''"''S>'ftIdun
III a IUffictcntl}'1arIf'~ make ~ -(~ dI&rf'lK'f' iD If'\unc up opumal
quanUl}' for 1Ul~. inl!i,idua!lW'WS\ '00 aeu it """'" 1.0 i',
Sunilarly.ro..lbeunder.n_II 1i, Idonl.l.... lDOl1'lbelransporUtiOllrostrxmd'i
2(r-c). ,1lO\'lllupw.-ardsr-l'. the dlk'f 1M opI.ima! productiOllq"antllM'Ol be<.'<x,...
to Y1 = <1>-1 (2) for sufficiently large games. This time, the optimal production quan-
titiesofindividualnewsvendorsinsufficientlylargegalllesbecollleprarticallyindistin-
guishable from the optimal quantities for a single under-mean newsvendor. Therefore,
again, other newsvenclorsin a sufficiently large game make ever-c1isappearingdiffer-
ence in setting up optimal quantity for any individual newsvendor who sets it close
5.4 Characteristic Functions and Individual allo-
cations
We now derive a formula for the lllaXi,nUIll expected profit I n , and the individual
allocation fJn in the game of size n. Let I(X) = f;(~ -X)¢(Od~ be the unit normal
loss function. Using the transformation Y=(X-!-')/(j, we have
ID(X) =E[max(D-X,O)] =(jE[rnax( D:'L -Y,O)] =(j1(Y),
Iz(nX) = E[max(Z -nX,O)] = vn(jE[max(Z~~' -vnY,o)] = vn(jl(vnY )
Then, (5.12) can be rewritten as
In(Y) = n(T -c)!-'-n(c-II)(jY -nt(jI(Y) -pvn(jl(vnY) (5.15)
For standard normal distribution, we have
I(Y)=¢(Y)-Y(l-<1>(Y)) (5.16)
(POrletlll, ZOO2, 1l8rtrnan afl(l Oro<, 2(05). Thill ,~lation is ~asil}' "",,6able b)' "Oling
thal.'(¥). -)'00'), Dy applying (a.l6) 10 (a.la)",~ ~
J.(y). n(r-e)(JJ' oY) -nlo(l/>(t') - )'4>()'ll-npo(~O(,fiiY)')'4>(,fiiY»)
(a 17)
ri ....]],.. by lleuilll Y 10 )'. in (a,I7). and thell appl~;ng tho: optimalit,. OOIld,tlOR!!l
III (a 11). a d ...... l furm elrl-'f'-..o f", lite lIl&lri",u'" elr~:1.I'd I'ffihlJ< FOf lIOftnai
Allbotl&h III smeraJ fiDol'", an allocatlOll III 1M CO«: of a u-ar-hipmmt p.nw IS
XP-Iwd (Cbea and ZbaJ,&, 20(9). lor ~'1IuneUY """",,..,j,ooj tbet'e· OIlIy one fOft
alloeetioD pQlMit*, lho:one ..-Itb all mii,idual alloeatiorlliftl.uaIlO 1/Il-lilof lbe J~
Lemma a.4. Fur all I S I <n. lo{t'.)- -j:P'>lJiil'.) Slo(},)' ~po(Jh,)
Proof- Toan,.~htioDcl_I ..... .IIlo<a~l9" .I~. 'I"herftor'e, III order fQl" tho:
alloeetiOll ,3" ((l ~ in the <'Ore of tm. u1L11S8hipment pme....., mUSl. h.a\~ I.J" ~ J,.
roranllsl<n, S,ooelhellllo<atioll 9" is uniqne, and b)'l1>rorcm I lheco«:iI
II lechnical'lOleillino,d('fAI thillpoint, Equatioo(5.18), forla,~,1l1l1('l1of"Ii'.
""'-'i 'ovt.ll'''''''''t~'''tltallloej.. 1s po..ili\",. This Is due to the fftct lb"t ".td/:t '''''mal
ditilribution Willi ,datively IargC.tAlld"rdd~'Via(io'lJi,negatil"" mnrkl'l<!eu'lIntllllU'e
F'rom Lmuna 54 it iii Itral&hdorward to died: lbal lbili -.unptOoa ftdj to J. 2; 0
Jor.un.
5.4.1 The Laws of Diminishing Indi\'idual allocations
11lIhi8l1OCtioo.•~~oo...lhAlth"l'Kh,·idll..1 ..lIOCl\liolld,,;nc....- ... n~.lhAlii
However, th"rearetwolaw~ofd;'llill",hiIlKilld;'idul\lllllo<:atio".thlltl\CC'{)lIll'/llIythi3
""",,,·th. The first isrourrrn..<t ..·;tblh""1",,,lut .. gaillll
.:l..·~-j,._1
.·Iucb d"nimsb as the~ of pnd ooa1llion n~"!., that IS
(S21)
\\1ule the fits\ law ensu.... that tJ- rat_~ .1_)"'5 h.LgbH thaD I. lh"..,..,.j
~llsth;"lo'O~bou"do.bowinlt""ltheablol"tepill.:l.......tll'll8l;l;lllCI'l
rolIhtioa .... n·drprDdlOIIt~u...lpOn.allOllrollllaodlhtratio"t1'bemtical
_ illIlIdJffllalft In 1M ~1Oll It Itilfiuti 10 uy roc- _Ibat our romputauooal
expenlneou."""T.~51.sbowlbatthtniticaln·~..t~. 1I~._
lihowlhatlbecrilicaln·~notexillfort<Z(c~,,);nlM~olO"l:l"·n>eUlp.t_
I...d lor I <Z(r-c} in thtcueolUnder'lIK'ftll plllOl(_return IOlbeexalll~;IlT.bIo.
;;1 tUI~......." d~.fin~ R" in Stoo:lion 5.5.1). n.c",. obticnlllions indint~ that Ihe higb
trnl"'I>Oflll\iollco,t;;prt'Clpilll\e tlll'criliC1\lsrnndCOlll!ilion n', BlldCOll!ieCJIlCnlly the
!Il'Wtld lllwofdiminishing indlvidunl nlloclllions. WeprOlrellllc'lh"lthecrllk,,1 n'
dOClltiotexist;;fo,eitherl_Oo'lJICmlgalll"'. WelclI,..,thernseoft_OforSeclion5.5
alKl",,"uIlICtMI/>OinthislieCtion.llolblll"-sofdllninishingind;\'idllaJallOCl\IIOnl
."''''')·f<Xdet.".mlDingthcro<ll_Btloll .......I.'"'....,.,"C"do''l~.."aJfor,ltol'''Ytoforln
• &,."d coahtlon In Sc-ct:ioo 5.5 The lint IS ~. for th", dlqll(' coopl'1"1ll1Ol1 ,.........'OI"k
tht8OCOl1d for tbehub We...,..PfU''elbetwo Letd(z)boelbeextl'llNOC'ol,J.
totbelll'tofpolilti\'eI'el1"umben.Webe&iIl ·nhl~I'olIoo.-iD&rt'lW11
Proof 1'belinltd.m,,,,"wof~(z)itl
TalM':'.\: Valllelloln' Alld n" r.-Iome 11lSU'lOOIiollhw""lllpllletil Callie
Th....don:',
J.Ji:1 _ -CJ[-I~)~f(y.l'P(-~f(vri~). ~f(vr}~)(~)"'."~}.))]
.....1-1~}~f(y.)-..-<vry61(~. ~y:. ,fi~I~)}
..... 1-~)~(If(I·.)-...rn(v'iI~).~f(,fi}~l'61:f(v';'1, II tnt.
From tqUa.l1l)ll {':'14l.... driillf' G(} ~.:)" t"'{.~l."..(.,/i}'.)-(~-e).. lIot ,mplle'll
fulK'tioa ..hil:tlobuim t~.....11"~541bon tbegapb olthill1mctioa lOr an.---
ollramro;hipmemp.<ne. A5'I .. obitn-.bltillf"~"4aDd..xutUIl&IO(5zr.).
Figure 5.4: G(Yx,x) for an Instance with r=40, c=15, v=lO, and 1=10
(5.25)
where /Ix = t</J(Yx) + .jXpq,(.jXYx). Note that *Yx ~ O. Hence, the first derivative of
j3(x) is simplified to
d~~X) = -u [PY;~~Yx) _ pq,;~x) _ PYx2~~}/x)] = uP~~~/x) (5.26)
The latter equation is obviously positive which proves thatj3(x) is strictly increasing
--
':;'Z) .. 1~(-<~~))
.. "P"'J'i~-t."fiO(."rr)~)
, r
.. B("'.ji[-o(.ji)~) (f)~' +z7;Yz)] -~';;O(Ji)~))
.. ."~~·)(z[~Y}>r~y,]+n
:-OIethatby~ladl\&th"tJ:";lhi\.jexplicitformula .."('&t't
We tlM"(' the following firsl la.. of di11linl~hing illdi,-i<!ual ~IlOC1ltio113
Thoor<'.llI 5.6 (Fil1lt 1,a"·olOilllin;"hi"gll,divid,,alalJocaliOllll). t:':;> I forn 2c'2
Proof Il~' TIIOOCi'IIl 5,5. 3(r) is lill"ielly ronea,-e, Thus. 23. > .i,.., + .i".• or eqUl'll·
....ltkj,,-J.._.>s...,_s...·\udlP'U'..... t~theon.>lll
III <ll'dt1- to JlrO'" tw lleOOalI Ia.. 01 dnwwohwc iDdi,-id.... alloaIt_ .., Aeed to
c:onsider tbe lIequeoor j .... ..J... By int.rodunl\& j(z) .. r,:l(z) M tw exteueioa 0\"'"
Lemma S.S. kl S(z) .. (z)~1_1)~. j(z) if ........... '/ S(z) 2; pl', aM
.flricu, ........".i/S(z)<p/'
S(r). (d;- I) fi:~~Y.) ~ ~
Fill&lly, j{z) is stricllyCOIl\-eX If/llldolily if !j};l >0, Ihal ill if/llldooly ifS(:1) <
'I'
n ... rullClionS{z)isnotmoootOlM'inSetlMlll.ltlibeba,iordepelId.lOlllhf,J'lfU''''''~n1
pMdI. FtgureS.Sdepi.cuS(r)I'orIlO_''Ill.... ollhetieJ'lfU'l'IIol'«'n Altboo&b'n
all ,nlIt_ S(z) litaJU _ an i~"C functioa.;\ dcM:II not.-..I\~
1~_zp;roorLlnF"....... SS(·)....J("l.lboernBCtioa~~"C
aflft".e:eu.m,"".... olr.lfS(r)ilaniDCr'Nlli.. fuBCtioafor_pandl.and't
~thecnlical,"".... olP/t.\ ..... ,I __ abat.... tbis,"" n... .... obIenatlOll
--.. in ~5.6i1tbat. if S(r) ilIlOlIl>OOOlOl"'. tbm il rNdwslhfocnlical
.-.J .... P/t,TIUstrailolbeM'iDriiailooblien..ble'nF~S.SlnFi&ureSS(.).
S(z).....ct- ilS IDUlmUID 0/ .. 0 16 at r" 10 .-1Ii1le tboe cnlical...t.... • pll S IQr
lhillllWla""". Also. iu F"tgure55 ("j. tht'fun<1ion S(z) readteaiuIl1ulluumo/ .. I ~
Lemma S.6. At a.., z ftdllJull ¥ _0. S(z) <p/l
Proof. Fin;l ~e IlIal .1 any Z liucb Illal zr; S I. S(z) ilIl1OQ-pot.lU,~and Illus
S(z) <pl'· 'I"hefefore, __U"~ ..;dOOl'lk.-ofv,,ef8.111Ylhalzt'l>1 forthere;1
of the proof \\'ella'~O(Y»/Q(JiY»-tlt>Ill: lienee
~ . ~(l>"_'J1""~~)
· ;(Ji[(I.....~.·.)•.1I.-"'~ .H'.'. ;1> _I)l~.·.)( •• ;'_l"'ll·-'''~I ;7.1.,;.-,,,,11"'''.')
· .1'·>"'·!I(r.·:· ..r.~·;)·HI;"I>-Il~"')(>r..;·-r.)- if·.'· 6-1
· "";""[r." .•r.,;;,.. (j".,. ",;;,.)"""-(j".,. ",;;,.)r.-\"'·&.I
· .1'·>"~~[ifY:·~"·i>r.I:.(•. ,)or.~y.. -jr.l!.t>-'Ir.~I··i7.-1
· .1"~'''![..r.~I:..;~JiI ... t>-I)or.~I'''>Ji~I:..r.~I··t7.1
Ulimg(5.25) thtlaUtrsimplilltlllO
lr(l7 -l)(zlJ -I) ~ O. lben~ > 0, Therefore....., _Ullie .;Ihout k.- of Vn-
tT1I.1itythat}';<Ib-tbtre<toftbeproof '\~._IIa.~¥.Oirandon1y
" ,
....r=="co.t 0.6OM Ot, '>
I ) 5 7 9 11 Il IS 17 l' 21 1J ~ 17 29
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l51'l1UlS17\'2InnnU
.(II .0.1
(.}[=40,c=15,v=1O,L=5 (b)1'=40,c=15,v=1O,L=10
.~ 1100
'/'-~~ ~.' ...I.' 'otI
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C., 200
, ,
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Figure 5.5: The Function S(x) with Respect to Different Parameter
Thi••imphr,,,,,to
....hichhol<bforr~O.i"ce'i':<I.Thilpro\'esthJl\rora"yrsuchth"t¥.O, ....e
h",.., S(r) <pft
Lemma :>.1, If "'(.t"). pIt for,w11lo! r" ) I, then SIr) ~ pIt fM all r ~ r" and
S(.c)<pftforIST<.c'
Proof. FrotH the proof of l,cmltl" 5.6, ~'e h"w~
(¥L .~[P<t>(Yl)(-r,-Yt'.i'l·.I)q¢('i',)(I'l·.I)]
.~[P(Y12-1),... t('i'1·"'1)1>0
If~ ~O for:e ~ I, then the Icttttna obviou.ly holds. Otherwise, let (¥)..r <0
fQ' SOllie r > 1. Then by Ibe ItttennooiRle Value TI~m for De,h.,.ti,,,,,, ".., hll\'e
(¥-)..,.o forSllm" I <c<:e'. Thm by u,rttma5,6 S(c) < ~ forlmy .uch c ....hich
impliCl! S(I) <~. Therefore, z") I if T' exi1<ts, ="OW for any t ....o points 1 < a < b.udt
that S{a) • S(b) • ~ ".., ha,.." by tIl<) H.ollo's Thwrem, a poit1t a < d < b such that
(¥L • o. For auy such l>oint "., h",., 5«(/) < ~ b)' Lemma 5.(;, CotlilequottLly,
(¥) O ....hiCh leadli 10 a cotltradiclion I>}-' [..e>,uua 5.6
TI'I'OTelll 5.1. If S(x") • pIt for """'" r' ~ I, then J(.c) ;.. conca"" for.c ~ z" and
oonvaforIs:e<z"
Proof. The proof directly follows from Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 5.7.
Wehavethefollowingsecondlawofdiminishingindividualallo alions.
Theorem 5.8 (Second Law of Diminishing Individual allocations). If S(x,} = pit for
somex· >1, then e~ ~ f01·n~n·, and 1 < e <~ jor25n<n·, wheren·
eqllalseithe'·lx·Jorrx·lor rx']+1.
Pmof. By Theorem 5.7, we have 2j" ~ j"+1 + j"_1 for n ~ rx'l + 1. Thus, 2n{3" ~
(n+ l}p".1 + (n-l}p"_1 and consequently (n-l)(p" - 19"-1) ~ (n+ 1)(19"+1 - Po).
Therefore e ~ ;;:+ for n ~ rx'l + 1. Also, by Theorem 5.7, we have 2j" < j".1 +
j"_1 for 2 ~ n ~ [x'J -1. Thus, 2n/3" < (n+ I}p"+l + (n-I}/3"_1 and consequently
(n -I) (19.. - p"-Jl < (n + I) (/3"" - /3"). Therefore, by Theorem 5.6, we hav 1 <
e <;;:+ for 2 ~ n ~ [x'J -1. It remains to consider lX'J an I rx'1. Assume, x·
is not an integer, thus lX'J * rx']. Let L(x} be the straight line connecting points
(lx'j,j(lx'J)) and ([x'1+I,j([x'l+I}},and let M(x} be the straight Iineconnecting
points (lx'J-l,j([x'J-I}) and ([x'l,j([x'l)). we have the following four cases to
If L([x']) ~ j([x']) and M([x'J) > j(lx'J), then~~~, and~ < /f.t-+.
Thus,n' =rx'l.
If L([x']) ~ j([x'l) and M(lx'J) ~ j([x'J}, then~~~, and~~ /f.t-+.
Thus,n'=lx'J.
IfL([x,]»j([x'])andM(lx'J»j([x'J),then~<~,and~</f.t-+.
Thus,n' =rx'l+1.
If L([x']) > j([x']) and M([x'J)~j(lx'J), then thereisx'>rx'l such that L(x} >
j(x} for rx'1-1 <x <x', and x" ~ [x'J such that M(x} < j(x} for x" <x~ lx·J.
We now show tbat this leads to a contradiction. First, consider the straight line
P(x} which is tbe part of L(x} between (lx'j,j(lx'J)) and ([x'l,j([x'])}, and the
traight Q(x) line connecting ([x'J-l,j([x'J-l» and (lx·J,j(lx·J)). The j(x)
remain below P(x) for [x' J < x < x' by definition of x', and j(x) remains below
Q(x) for [x'J-l < x < [x'J because j(x) is convex there. Now consider JI/(x) , it
taysaboveQ(x) for [x'J-l <x<[x'Jsincej(x)isastrictlyincreasingfunctionand
thus j(lx'J) <j([x·l). Therefore, we have x"> [x'J which leads to acontradicti n.
Finally, consider [x'J ; [x'l, then x' is an integer. we have two cases to consider. If
L(x') ~ j(x'), then~ ~ ~. Thus, n' ; x'. Otherwise, L(x') > j(x') and then
~<;;:+.Thusln·=x~+l.
We have the foUo\\;ng result with respect to theexistenceofn·.
Theorem 5.9. For over-mean games with t < 2(c - v), undel'-lnean games with t <
2(r-c), and mean game non'<oo exists.
P7VOj. From Theorem 5.7, it is clear that the existence of n' d pends on thc existence
of x'. Consider over-mean games with t < 2(c-v) and assume that th re exist x' < 00.
According to Lemma 5.7, for all x ~ x· it mu t be the case that S(x) ~ pit> O.
However, by Theorem 5.4 we have Iimz_~ S(x) ; 0 for t < 2(c - v) which leads to a
contradiction. Hence, there exist no x· < 00 and thus no n' < 00. A similar argument
proves the theorem for the under-mean games with t < 2(r - c). loreover, in mean
games we have Yz ; 0 and therefore S(x) < 0 < pit. By Theorem 5. ,then there would
benon'<oo for mean games.
5.5 Games with Cooperation Costs
In the transshipment game of ize n with cooperation cost any coalition of t. 1 ~ I ~ n,
symmetric new vendor incurs cost K, needed for it to form. The characteristic
function, j : 2N .... JR, of the tran hipment game with cooperation costs is r1efine<1
by etting i,; j/- K, for any coalition of size 1 ~ I ~ n. Since the newsvendors are
anonymous and symmetric, there is only one allocation possible in the core, if one
exits, namely the one with all individual allocations equal to ~-th of the in. TIllis,
the individual allocations must bean;,!:, ;fJ,,-~K... Hence, any coalition of size 1
getslan;l,!:, allocated. Therefore, in order for the allocation a" to bein the core of
a transshipment game with grand coalition of size n and cooperationcosts, we must
have In" ~ i/o for any 1 ~ I < n, and rl0 n ; j". The latter couditioll is satisfied hy
definition of On, the former reduces to
an ~o" VI <no (5.2)
Th refore, the core of the transshipment game with cooperation costs is non-empty
if and only if the condition (5.28) is satisfied. Let 1[11; {(J,n}lnEJ\I} as the set
of all such transshipment games. Weint nd to analyze the impact of coalition size
non thestahilityofgames in 1[11 under the assumption that the total cooperation
cost for a coalition i proportional to the total number of links the coalition creates
in its cooperation network. We consider two alternative cooperation network: {I}
Clique network, and {2} Hub network {Figure 5.6}. By abstracting various types
of costs, we presume that the cooperation costs are lump sum monetary amounts
whi h represent the investments that any given pairofnewsvendorsmake in order to
establish a hi lateral link in the network. Let I< he the per-link cooperation cost. In
the Clique network, each pair of newsvendors is connected by a separate link. The
total nlllllber of links in a clique network withn newsvendors is thlls n{n-l}(2 and
the total cooperation cost is K~ique ; ~J<. The condition {5.2 } then becomes
fJn - fJ/ ~ ~J< for all 1< n. Therefore, the core of the transshipment game with the
clique network is non-empty if and only if the cost per link I< atisfies the following
w,. pn1'~ that tbe muimum .dm"1* 00IiUI K::- is al_}'S ..tUined at I • n - I
lIISodIonSSI.11lleJl_ndMlfkporllll) lbeoitUllliona-bere\nt","lrans5hipmmu
~coordill..tt'dthrou&b ..~~,.,.,.oo.allotber.....'S>1':JIdorsane~
onIYIOllwtldeoiwwtled_li~1lM'lot.allln",b.... oCbnbint","hub",",,"""k
ISlhm n· l.ndt","~tion(.'<Jllt;"K... ~(n~I)K. TI...rondilioa (S.28) lben
~S.-";tI;JKf.. aJll<n '""""""""I","CI:In':oCtbetl'llll9Sbipmenlp'''''
..-ithlllf'bubrll'l....k.,_nptyillllldonlyiftllf'(.'<JIIt perllllk KlIlIlilifialllf'
auamM all. I 01" l~"a ..... n" aurill.baII~lD1.DUIIum .altamfd ul. I
l'orallpmelW\lhr.ewerthann" DtW'f-maudall.n~I""'aIIp.nw.nlhal
IeMln"I>f"tI"S\'!11dort Thi8bipolarrirK'tfortMhubun..-orkila~oftM
,;ecoo(1b..,ofd,mlnlslllll&individualal\ocauQRIlp\""in'Theoreln(i,ll
5.5.1 Positive Transportation Cosls
We lx'gill ..·Ith a th~m thai ilia OOnlil-"lllC'~of the lawlI ofdi",illis"iIlS Illdi,1dual
allocalion&. T"e IheQrem ill boy ill delenuilll'l& Ule maximum admilolible COOlS for
botbdiq.... andbubnet ..'Of'ks.Let"·beth,,smallestnb...... t ..llt~<Oif
l<lldP.n.,...and'nfiu't)'Olh"......·..,..
T1Mlo>rem :>.10. "" .....""
/orn<no·atUll<n••rul
/()r,,~,," lI"dl < II. MortCt'<!rn">w
protJf- \\·.. fi.llImo..·,baIH~~forIlUn<n.. androralll<n Theproofili
lIrindlK1.ioI. C\ea.rly, the inequality holds fOl" n.Z. Asoimuet"atithoklobZsn
and b a111<n.1Il1d addJtlOOlA1l)" n. I <n", We pn.>'o"tbar. lbea II bokkb n' I
Webr..,,~~~.~_SlllCf'brl~inducti\,,_puonH~~
for /Ill I < n, then 8. - S. ~ {,j" - 3,)!f.:h for alii < n. Thus,
foralll<n, 8y_mptionn.l<n··.lbm~<!:,.,,·hidlimpliel
foralll<n .Inn. I.... illftluahl}'ld<kfor n·1 and ",. mduetion for aD n <....
11IlliendoitheprooliIn".oo. ~.Iet ... _~n··<oo,WeOOlrtJ.o.o
IhalifH<!lf.:hforall/<".andn··.n'I.Ihet1~<!~roralll<n.1
TOM'elh~llOIellw~·~-~_Smcw:H<!~futalll<n.lhen
a~ I-If.:h foralll<n. nn.
furall/<n lI~w, ~<:....h.chim~
rvr.lll<".M"'t'UI",.lh"lA.li"'''I ...Jjty(orl ... -lil1lpl;.,;e<!~·th..t ..
~ <! h. A("('or<1ll1jt to Theorem 8. it mlt!ll be the """" that" • - 1 ~ II' Tin,",
FiI\a.II... _libo.tlw~~~for .. ~ ..""andall/< .. "'Ulduet... \\"e
DawJ"",!ibownthatlbllllllequabtyboldlrorn_ .."" :,\.,..~a.a;u'~lhatilbold.i
forall .. ~n·· and pro.~lbatitUoholdlf<w... I.i.e..~ ~ for all
To_<h•• _",,,,,,~.,.~.,.(et-;)(~)s,,~~·,..
i"d"~Ii\'e """\lllllltion N:;~~. the'l
Since ... I>" ·>n·.thenbyn.eore.n5.8...~ha'~e~~. ll>erefoft.
for all/ < n' I Thllll. 1M inequality hold. lOr n' I. and by iDd"c~lion (<II" all II ~ II"
Thillend8the prooCofthe Iboorem
Table :>.1 "bIodetlJOllbtratelllhe \'1\11101 ofw" for ItOme i!l>I"llcesof InllllQ;!lipment
Clique Nchiork
We &re __ ready to lidenmne the m&X!mUm IIdmlltiible t'OISt per link for lllO1' clIQue
f'roofll.. (5JO)~lX'edtosbowthat"--.:l-'ls~forall/<n.w1udliU'q\ll'-a.ltI>t
toM~n-lforlllJl<n,\\'ehll'"<l
By Th~'Ore1ll5.6, ll.fi S ll.n_l S '" Sll."I, Ihus the right hllnd side "milS 1111 [0 lit le"'l
n-I, .... hichpl'O\"<llithetheorem
F'urthern}()l"C, themaximurnadmissibleCObtfortbecJiquenet"",losisdCl:reasillgllnd
tendstoO lIS th<! number of ,te....svcndors gro...."
TlIoor",,, 5.12.1\::- i$dC(:f'fiJ.Singimll, IIl1dlim..__ K::-.O.
Proof- By Theorem 5.\\. it needs to be showll {3.,-p~ , S {3., 1-{3., 1, for,,) 2, whieh
is eqni'1'Ilenl to ll.~ :s; ..l.~_, ror ,,) 2. TI,e lllu~.,. hold!! by Theorml 5.6. Mo....v.-er, by
Th~'Orellls 5,1\ lim.._.. K::- _ 2Jim,,_.. (11~ -11~_,) • 2{lim._.. tJ.. -lin",_.. I1~_,) •
The roUowillg corollaries rouow irnrnedilltely from Theore,n 5 12
Corollary 5.2. For /h( cliqtte, given t~t COOpmllion eo'll per lint K, th~.-.. II mw:·
imhm IrQrwhiprIlenl g4r1l( siu 5(1\) fhelllMI oUlrQrwAipmenl g4m"" la"ftr lMlI
5(1\) MIN' m<ply eores, 11M alllrnwshiptn(ni gam"" of ~:e not aceeding 5(1\) hQllll
CorollHry 5.3. For lhe clique, all IrtlWshipment gam"" h,.ml """·e",plyeo.",,, only
if the coopmllioll eostp<:rlinkK_O
11'e mllximum ..dmi"llible COb! for lite hub ItCt"",,1os is dC1t'rmirted llII foil",,"
lorn<n·· .....
"'::-'-n(n-I)(a..-a...,)
lor n ~ n"
PrvoJ-IlneedslObed>oralhool~~~forn<rI"andl<n .•·1uch
III ~U,,'aien11O H ~ "r'-tr ror-.lll < n. The LaHer bokis b,- TIloomn 510 For
n ~n". "",.-d 10..00... n(n-I)(d,,-d.._d ~ MI<n. which ilIrqniva!oenl
lo~~¥(n-l)roralJl<n_T"elllltcrholdsb)·11Iette",5.10
Fllrt"ennore. "-ehll'~I"efoll()'Ol'inlthrore,,,
Tl"..'(lrlm' 5.14. K~" u ;nc.....$ing or." lorn < n", ond durr;<u;ng "" 'I for .. ~ fl"
Proof, Welll...e
llyllellill«j_n lin1lleon-m51O,.'!:obIa.in~~~for,,<,,"lllllll.
un<n" lI~,I~~mequalltVlmpllelllmmedialel)·thool~~~
!'or,. <n" "Jloerefclr'l:. br TIwoftm 5 13. ,,:::-~ K~ for" < ,."
In order toM''!: K::-~ K~ ror n ~n". _need n(n-I)(j" -,1".,)~ (n -I)(n-
2)(.f,,_I-3,....')rorn~n"byTIwuem513.Thlliiuequalltyiliftlw.........I0~~
~ro..n~n" 1"IN'Ofem510ro..n~n"andl_n_2si\'el~~~.Fioall,·
~;:: 1m .. .~ -I,.. -, - iON.
.. ,I nOlO " .. I .•";~::.
',i1 .>1. M ,... ,.... .....
,., M;}::'
Nt::: lbi. ..... -
19...
Tabl" [,.2: An EJUllllple ofQ,,,r-[nCIIIl Gllm"" (r .. 40, C. 15, lind II" 10)
",hichi",pli('li~:l:~forn~,,··..srequired
We lliwe the follOl'o';llg ASymptotic results aoout the maximum admi""ible costs with
positiVll trllllsportatioll COIiIS under hub network struclure
Th""",,,, 5.15. We ha"., lim~_ .. K~":l: (J [(r-v}¢(}',) -19(11)1
l~~ "(~-'i,) ·l~n~;f:; l~~[ (r-v)¢(Y,) -I¢()'.) - po<:;;t.)]
" ol~~[(r-II)~YI)-t6(Y"l-p¢{~)'·)]
The IlIlit co''''erg'''' \Q O'[(r-v)¢(Y,)-I¢(o»).
Th,,,,r~m 59 giv,-", sufficient conditions ror Ihe in''<lualily ill Throrem 5.15 to I>e<:<>mc
"" equlllity. TII!>le 5.2 nnd Figure 5.7 show K~"" /Illd K:"/LS f""ctio'lJj of the ",,,,,~r
OfllcwsvcndofllUfor\lIriollStrRlIsport/lliolll'06tsl. TheK:"'",ayormayllothll\"<l1l
!<inglc maximum. If i1 dO<'llthe "umlx.,. of ncw>;'"ndors " •• at the "'lUi",,,,,, depends
011 Le.g. ".'. IQ£ort_1511Ild,,··.3fort_W. By Th<'Orertl S.9...··: 00 fort S
Ourexperilllellt.>illpto,,_IOOdonotyiddtlH!"·· £ort: 10, Iherefore, it is possil>le
Ihlll£orlhi.,.,.11lethe"'lUj"'"rtlhap~n"81Iarger,.,.IUI.'Sof"orllolal8II
...~
(.jC1lq"" ....W<rl
.. "-----------::~~
{blHDb __
Fi&ure5.;: Exalnllleol'Mu:imum Admiull.>leCoM per U"kalja FmlMlOI,oCn (r. 40.
,,_15,&00,,_10)
5.5.2 Free Transportations
In this ~lOIl"~~me that the tl'llD!llJl'lllnent.t ace £me, that .. '"' let 1.0 AI-
II>ou&h tbe 8/ifiUIIlpti<m of free tranllShllll'letllli IS rathl.'r re!itnn,,",,, 1\ a-traHli l'tlt'"
lraR!!!>hip",mt>!...b~tbrlraor<pOft.\iooolAoodscanbr~..,thllOal&",Jka.n1
rotiU.or ..hen'theprod""""'......tirectl'...tomeT1lloeftChotheril\lil_lofln...sslllp-
I'illg the acluaJ "roduct (llee\\'ang'lIId I'lIrlllr (19'J.1) for an e'l/Ill'I'lo, ofth" IIltler)
By~lIillgl.Oi,,(r.14} ...eobllljll
(5.33)
andb)·>oettlll&I.O;Il(r..IS)aOO_... t533)_~
(5.3<
".
Clique Nel"'ork
The IOlllJ'i"""" &dmi~lhle COIIIt for diq"", with COIIItlcSll transpurilltiolllj is ... follows
Theul'1.'''' 5.16. h--;:- 201(r-I')¢()',)(-;rh-1.;).
ProofBy(53-1)alld~n511
Uub Nel."urk
($.3.»
TIwnrore. the '1WUlllum admllllible (OIl lor hubs wilh 00Sl1es!l u.D"porUlionI iI ...
Proof llneo:o<btobt~"llthat~ilIinnftlSl'l&,nlaodtbU!l.u...... mmj"'\l....t
f I Thus.,t8l.lffi<.wtoshootthat ~>m_Tbelatter~ualil)'holds"u.or
.Ji>';;-T Tberrlore,~ ilil'lfte.>llllinlaodatWollilSmimmumatl I. 0
OJntrary to the diqlll' lM"t...ub. Ib.. 00IlIi~ as the pmt IiU.e JI'O"'"S ...·b",..
folJoqfrom l""l'olloortfll,theoreln.
Pmof We,lOOdtomo..·lb"l K~<K::t, Tbis",eq'''''il}.bokh;lIioce&<~
OlA"ousIy, ll"'~~..~. I. ",KllhU!llJlll~_ .. K:"'.,,(r-,,)~)',) 0
Corollary 5.'., If 1M lnmuhipmenl ,92'''''' 1I.;/h n ne-w.wendon Iuu a tum·t:mpl~ 001'f
fOrCOJlpl'rlinkK,lhenJodoIlU14rg·rgdm",,1IIilhlheJllmeCO$IJll'r'link.
Th<OQre",,, $.17 and 5.18 also i"'l'ly tl..t the nlllllberofsYIllllletrie news'·l.'1ldo"'"IA)'
be i"suf]icir"t, for a gi''Cn oot;t per lilll< K,tohllV<:llstllblcOOlllition.lllotherwords,
if 'I' s)"1I11lletric ncw"''CtldorsOOllsidercoopeT8ting in agamc "'ithcoopeT8tionCOllt
per link K, then K~~ ( K prove; that their grand OOlIlitioll is too expeusi''C to
forTll for it is simply too s",all. Themo"', _rching for mor<) symmelric llews,'Cn·
dOT!i "'illillg toj<>in in andexllaud tl:egalneoould Illake the lrallsshipnlentgame
worth playillg. To filld the Sl..... of thi>llllitllllUd eJ<plUlSJUll Ollt: n,...,ts 10 soh... the
<'<I"ation K z Il'(r- ,,)¢(Y,j (~), tQ determine" ll>ing thc b~tioll method and
then rollnd "l,thc solutioll 10 the cl....."'t integer. FillalJy,sl1btl1lCtlllgII' ""Ollldgive
the r<'<lllirOO C:<l>ansioll size. C1...... rly.only if the cost vcr link K dot'S llOtexcecd
0(,-,,)4>(1'1) (&) all size gamelarc,,"Orth I,laying for all of tllem h.ll'"", nO"~lllpty
5.5.3 Mean Ncwsvcudors
WCI\O'A·oonsidcra"importalltcascdm<'llnsyllllllctricllc"·s'"Cndors.
"ew",,,ndor marginal profit <'<Illllls the margmall.- of ll"sold items. that is '-C. c-"
III this"""". by Le"una J, ~'. zOfor itO!: 1. Therefore, the maximulIl CX1>eetcd profit
in (5.J8)beoo,nCli
(5.36)
Wc have the following ",,,,,h,,nlll ll<klissihlc COllI for the di'lliC neLwork of 11\,-",,,
Proof. J3y(5.36) and TIleorcllla.lI
The key difference between the maximum admi ible cost in this theorem and the one
in Theorem 5.16 is that the formerd pendsont. Therefore,thehighertran portalion
co ts the fewer news\'endor can playa tran hipment game with non-empty core for
agivencooperationcostperlinkJ<.
We have the following ma.x.imum admissible cost for the hub network of III an new \'en-
Theorem5.20.J<~"b=7f.;(~).
Proof. By (5.36),~ = 7f.;(~). As shown in the proof of Theorem 5.17,
~ is increasing on I and atLains its minimum at I = 1. Therefore, the ma.xi-
mum admissible cooperation cost per link of the hub network structure for which the
tra.nsshipment game with n symmetric newsvendors has non-empty core is I(!~"b =
For any fixed transportation cost t, th counterparts of Theorem 5.1 and Corollary
5.4 hold for mean symmetric vendors. Again, the key difference is that maximum
admissible cost in this case depends Oil t. Therefore, tbehighertransportalion 0 ts
the fewer symmetric newsvendors suffices to playa tran hipment game with non-
empty core for a given cooperation cost per link.
5.6 Comments
Thestabilityofthegamcswithasymmetricagentsandarbitrarynetworkstructurcs
canonlybedeterminednum ricallythroughtheexaminationofallpossiblesubcoali-
tionsand their comparison with the individual allocations under grandcoalilion. This,
even if possible in tbeory, can only be done for limited game sizes in practicedlle to
theproblemofcomplltationalintractability. Therefore. tbere is a great need for the
insightobtainedaualyticallywhicbthi chapteri motivated by.
This chapter is tbe first to incorporate cooperation costs in the analy is of decen-
tralizedtranssbipmentgamesilltheoperationalresearchaudoperationsmanagement
literature. We believe that inclllding thecooperatioll cots into the game theory
based sllpply chain models provides, and will continlleto provide, new and inter t-
ing insigbts into tbeir po ibleapplicationinreal-lifesllpplychaincoordinatiolland
management.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Open Problems
The opportunities for resear h on supply chain contracting and coordination are
numrrou-aspartlyshown in Chapter 2. In faet, thereseareh on supplyehain eon-
tracts is still in its infancy and th re is plenty of room for building upon the current
research and expanding it. The analysis of the literature in Chapter 2 reveals that
most of the coordinating contracts require the following preliminaryconditions: (1)
rationality of the players, (2) absence of contracting costs, (3) complete knowledge
rrueture, (4) ri k neutrality, and (5) profit orientedness. However, 1110 t of these
assumptions, if not all, do not provide an adequate realistic picture of the supply
chains in which they ought to be applied. Agents might not know how tooplimize
their decisions or they may not have the sufficient computational power to actually
calculate them. The information sharing among the agents is very limited. Agents'
behavior is opportuni tic and therearevariou types of agents with regard to their
utilities. Therefore, unless the gap between the theory and the practice does notcloe,
the insights achieved from the research will be questionable. Amongthepossibililies
for future research in thi area are: (1) incorporaling the under-analyzed aspect of
supply chain contracting, e.g. verifiability and compliance; (2) refining the definition
of acceptability in coordinalingcontract ; (3) considering more general uLility func-
tions of supply chain members in order to capture realistic decision making criteria;
(4) investigating more complex supply chain topologies; and (5) strengthening the
uscfulnessoftheoretical insights through empirical and case-basedstudies.
With respcct to the decentralized transshipment problem, in Chapter3,weproposed
a contract with an implicit pricing mechanism (demonstrated in Lemma 3.1) that can
coordinate the transshipments in a two-agent supply chain. This contract has several
desirable properties. First, the implicit pricing mechanism gives rise to the choice
of the best production quantities (see Theorem 3.1). This is particularly important
because the linear pricing mechanisms in Rudi et al. (2001), Hu et al. (2007), and
Huang and Sosic (201Ob) do not necessarily lead to the Nash equilibrium being the
best production quantities. S cond, the implicit pricing mechanism allows for an
arbitraryclivisionoftotalexpectedextraprofitaccorclingtothe bargaining powcrs
Third, whell the agellts fix the npgotiated trail hiprnent prices they usually haw
multiple alternatives to choose [rom (as Theorem 3.2 implies). Thus, a secondary
criterion can alsobeusecl to fine-tune the choice of transshipment prices. We suggest
the minimization of the yariances of the agents' individual profits. A direction for
generalization is to include the agents' competition when they choose their market
selling prices. Recently, Zhao and Atkins (2009) analyze the transshipment prices ina
two-agentsupplychainwher price-sensitivedemandfunctionsreAectthecompctition
over the selling prices.
Wehaveadclressed theclecentralizecl transshipment problem with nagentsinChapter
4. The contracts based on allocation rules address the coordination for this problem
butthepracticaldifficuiticsofallocationrlllcsmolivatedourapproach. The contracts
with transshipment prices provide more flexibility by letting the individual agent
choose their transshipment partners. The allocation rule proposed in Anupindietal.
(2001) has the desirable property of both being in tbe core of the second stage coop-
erative garne and coordinating the individual decisions on production quantities. For
thosereasons,wehaveconstructedourtransshipmentprices(asshowninLcmma4.2)
upon those allocations. We showed that with the transshipment prices derived from
this allocation rule, the optimum transshipment patterns are always pair-wi estable
(see Theorem 4.2). Moreover, by carrying out the optimum transshipment patterns,
eachageut receives a prolit which equals the Auupindietal. (2001) allocatiou for that
agent (see Corollary 4.1). The contribution of Chapter 4 is to implement a solution
concept from the network games in two-sided markctsfor thelirst time in analyzing
the decentralized transshipment problem
Chapter 5 of the thesis incorporates the costs of cooperation into theanalysi of the
stability of decentralized transshipment games in coordinated supply chains. In order
to obtain provable results, we have considered supply chains withsymmetricnewsven-
dorsandindependentandnormallydistributeddemands. Assuming cooperation cost
to be directly proportional to the nUl11ber of links in the coalition network,weexamine
two general network structures: Clique, where all agents are connected toea hother,
and l1ub,whereallagentsaresolelyconnected to a designated agent. We provide the
conditions for tbe stability of such games. Drawing upon the two laws of diminishing
individual allocation (Theorem 5.6 and Theorem 5.8), we demonstrate that under
the clique structure, the stability of symmetric transshipment games becomes more
susceptible to the cooperation costs as the number of participating newsvendors in-
creases (see Theorem 5.12 and Corollary 5.2). However, this effect is bi-polar under
the hub structure, tbat is, while increasing tbe size of game, up to a certain size,
enables newsvendors to handle larger cooperation cost per links,and this increase in
size after some threshold will negatively impact the stability of the grand coalitions
(see Theorem 5.14). Though the characteristic function in the transshipment games
1--
studied in Chaple, 5 are eXIJeClOO val"C!! of J>O!l6ihle allocations, which is alBa the
",.,.., for the galllC'l studied in Slikkeret Ill. (7OlX» Budehe" and Zhang (2009), we
reaIi7-"th1ltI",ooequatelink !>etween thescga",,,,,andtliedeterministicgallleswitli
the dIRToct"r;"ti" functioll dmcrminoJ by the rcalization ofdclllllndsstilinoods to
be "",,,blbhed. An irnmedinte hnl'or!/lIl! dirc<;tion for further re;enrch i~ to .tlldy
OOlluooted net...urks thllt filII het,,-een lhe diquc lind Ihe hub. Yetallothcr is the ex-
t<:,nsionofthemode]t<>indudecorrelatiollllt.>et\\"Cenne"'1ivcnd"",'dclllllndS. Also, it
remainsop"""'hcth("fornot thcexis\t>JIc.:ofafinite,," impliesl!leexislcuCl'of"fj"ite
n", Finally. thelrllllS>;!Liplllcnlgametiw;thoo0l'cralioncoo(Splll)'OO byM)'IHIn','\ric
n"wsvendors remain" great dLRllcllge for IIrlRlyliclll trcat",e"l for nOw. They remain
soew~1l under IIle/lSSulIll'tionthllt de11lalld811rc nonna! and indl.'llCndent though "'jlh
different me'''1:i an,I.lan,lard ,IN·iatio"". However, IlOllIe qucstio,," moti\'a\t~ll>y this
chapter ml'ly 00 II lcsscr ch"llellg<J and yet provide illt<;fCl;tillgiu.iKh\.'i. One such II
'lUCS!iOll is when "..,uld the game 00 "''l,,·mt...n, undt.,-·mean. Or melln'! Or ,,-heu(\oco;
the '"aximum admissibleOOl\! p,erlillk for huboi rcU"UIl nnimodal? Theseqn"'li"I\'
are Icft ror future rescarch
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Appendix
Derivation of (3.4) alld (3.5)
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Derivation or 5.8, 5.9, and 5,10
EI",in(X,DH -x Ix- /(D)dD. [~D/(D:D
.X(I-F(X)).Xf'(X)- f_ F(D)dD
.X- I_F(D)dD
E[max(X-D,O)] = l~(X-D)f(D)dD
= X 1~ f(D)dD -1~ ~f(D)dD
=XF(X)-XF(X)+ l~F(D)dD
= l~F(D)dD
E[min (nX,Z)] =nX1; fz(Z)dZ+ 1:: Zfz(Z)dZ
=nX(J-Fz(nx»+nxFz(nX)-l:x Fz(Z)dZ
=nX - l:
x
Fz(Z)dZ
JD(X) = fx~ «( -X)fD(Od(
= fx~UD(Od(-X fx~ fD(Od(
=/L-1~UD(Od(-X(J-FD(X))
= /L - 1~ FD(Od(
E[min(X,D)] = 1; FD(Od(=/L-E[m~:(D-X,O)] =/L-JD(X)
E[max(X-D,O)] = L:;X-OfD(Od(= l~FD(O(=JDU()+X-/L
E[min(nX,Z)] =1 Fz(Od(=n/L-!z(nX)
Derivation of 5.14
Assume y is a normal random variables with mean Jl.JJ and standard deviation 0,," Then,
the random variable x :: aU + f3 is also a normal random variable with mean J.1z = o'/lJl + p
anclSlandard deviation az=au'll' Hence,ifyisasLaudard normal random variable l the, x
would beanonnal random variables wilh mean 0 and standarddeviationB.
Now, Fz(X)=P{x~X} =P{C7Y+I'~X} =P{ys ¥} =<I>(Y), where Y =¥.
imilarly, if z = nx is the random variable which is the summation of n normal random
variables with mean Ji and slandard deviation U t then J.Lz = nJ.L and U z = J'iiq. Now,
F,(nX) =P{z~nX}=P{,fiiC7y+nl'~nX} =P{ys~} =<I>(,fiiY), where Y =¥.



